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DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CONTROL OF 
FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN FRANCE 
Charles Torem* and William Laurence Craig** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
IN February of 1968, the authors described at some length the laws and regulations governing the control of foreign investment in 
France and the policies of the French government in exercising that 
control.1 Since that report, however, a number of dramatic changes 
have occurred in France. In May 1968, social unrest, starting in th~ 
universities and spreading to the labor unions, led to a general strike 
and a paralysis that threatened to topple the government itself. 
Despite a dramatic restoration of order by the government, President 
de Gaulle's bid to obtain a new mandate from the French people in 
the form of a referendum on the issues of "regionalization" and the 
reformation of the Senate failed, and thereafter he resigned from 
office in April 1969. A special presidential election was held and 
Georges Pompidou, President de Gaulle's Prime Minister from 
April 14, 1962, to July 10, 1968, became President and formed a new 
government with Jacques Chaban-Delmas as Prime Minister. The 
cumulative burden of social upheaval, which had resulted in the 
effective shutting down of the greater part of France's industrial 
plant for a period of nearly three months, followed by months of 
political uncertainty, placed substantial pressure on the French 
balance-of-payments position. Despite the reinstitution of exchange 
controls in November 1968, large amounts of capital fled the country 
for "safer havens." Finally, in August 1969, the franc was devalued 
twelve per cent. 
All these events have had an effect on attitudes toward foreign 
investment and have led to a policy that is, on the whole, receptive 
to it. At the same time, the new government has begun to establish 
guidelines for distinguishing those relatively few investments that it 
will oppose.2 This Article will first review the legal provisions for 
the control of foreign investment in France and then will analyze 
• Member of the New York Bar. A.B. 1935, Amherst College; LL.B. 1938, Harvard 
University.-Ed. 
•• Member of the New York and District of Columbia Bars. A.B. 1954, Williams 
College; LL.B. 1957, Harvard University.-Ed. 
1. Torem &: Craig, Control of Foreign Investment in France, 66 MICH. L. R.Ev. 669 
(1968). 
2. See pt. IV. C. infra. 
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them in light of France's position in the Common Market3 and its 
other international obligations. Finally, it will attempt to describe 
the developing guidelines established by the government for foreign 
investment and will illustrate the application of these guidelines by 
a survey of recent investment cases. 
II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF REGULATION 
A. Basic Investment Regulations 
The principal elements of the current French legal regime on 
foreign investment date back to December 1966 and January 1967. 
A detailed description of this regime, which has been earlier treated 
at length,4 will not be repeated here. A brief summary, however, may 
be useful before proceeding to an examination of more recent de-
velopments. 
Law Number 66-1008,5 signed by President de Gaulle on Decem-
ber 28, 1966, abolished a complex structure of exchange control 
regulations dating from 1939 and dramatically declared that "[f]inan-
cial relations between France and other countries are free." 0 How-
ever, this law did give the government power to regulate foreign 
investments in France, French investments abroad, and exchange 
operations by decree if necessary to defend national interest. 7 This 
power was almost immediately invoked to erect an entirely new 
system for the control of foreign investments in France and French 
investments abroad. Decree Number 67-78 of January 27, 1967,8 in 
setting up this new system, defined the category of "direct invest-
ments" to include 
[t]he purchase, the creation or the extension of any business, branch 
or individual enterprise; [and] [a]ll other operations which alone or 
together with others, concurrently or consecutively, have the effect 
of permitting a person or persons to acquire or increase the control 
of a company . . . , whatever may be its form, or to assure the ex-
pansion of such company already controlled by them.0 
Thus the creation of a French corporation, or obtaining or increas-
3. The terms "Common Market," "European Economic Community," "EEC," and 
"Market" are used interchangeably in this Article. 
4. See Torem 8: Craig, supra note I, at 676-96. 
5. [1966] J.O. 11621, [1967] D.S.L. 30. 
6. Id. art. I. 
7. Id. art. 3. 
8, [1967] J.O. 1073, [1967] D.S.L. 81. 
9. Id. art. 2(3)(a) 8: (b) (emphasis added). For further discussion of this definition, 
see Torem 8: Craig, supra note I, at 682-87. 
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ing control of an existing one, by foreigners constituted a "direct 
investment." Similarly, certain activities of any French corporation 
already under foreign control, such as the acquisition of a new plant, 
the establishment of a branch, or the creation or acquisition of 
another French corporation, also fell within the category of "direct 
investments."10 While this hastily drawn decree11 was silent with 
respect to what constituted "control," administrative practice has 
applied a very strict test. Indeed, in some cases, the purchase of only 
small percentages of the capital of a corporation has been said by 
the Ministry of Finance to constitute a purchase of control and 
hence to be a direct investment.12 Likewise, financial dealings other 
than the purchase of an equity interest may effectively submit a 
French company to foreign economic control;13 thus, these relation-
ships may be classed as "direct investments." 
Direct investments were made subject to the filing of a prior dec-
laration with the Ministry of Finance. The Ministry could, within 
two months after the filing, require a temporary postponement of 
the investment to allow further study or to permit changes by the 
applicant in the conditions of the investment in order to meet gov-
ernment objections.14 In some cases this temporary postponement 
was permitted by the Ministry to ripen into an ajournement defini-
tif, or, in effect, a denial of investment authorization.15 I£ the 
Ministry did not act within two months, or if prior to the expiration 
of that period it renounced its right to require a postponement, the 
applicant was free to proceed with the project.16 
In contrast to foreign direct investments (which were subject to 
the prior-declaration procedure and the "postponement" mecha-
nism), foreign loans and financings of all other kinds needed prior 
specific authorization from the Ministry of Finance before a transac-
tion could be executed.17 This procedure was to be followed for all 
borrowings from abroad that did not constitute direct investments 
under the definition of Decree Number 67-78. Three categories of 
10. Decree No. 67-78 of Jan. 27, 1967, art. 2(3)(a) &: (b), (1967] J.O. 1073, (1967] 
D.S.L. 81. 
11. The haste was necessitated by a provision of Law No. 66-1008 of Dec. 28, 1966, 
[1966] J.O. 11621, (1967] D.S.L. 30, that gave the government only thirty days in which 
to issue decrees reinstituting controls. See Torem &: Craig, supra note 1, at 678-79. 
12. See Torem &: Craig, supra note I, at 685. 
13. See Torem &: Craig, supra note 1, at 685 &: nn.68-69. 
14. See Torem &: Craig, supra note 1, at 679, 682 &: n.58. 
15. Decree No. 67-78 of Jan. 27, 1967, art. 4(1), (1967] J.O. 1073, [1967] D.S.L. 81. 
See Torem &: Craig, supra note 1, at 682. 
16. Decree No. 67-78 of Jan. 27, 1967, art. 4(1), (1967] J.O. 1073, (1967] D.S.L. 81. 
17. See Torem &: Craig, supra note I, at 687-89. 
288 Michigan Law Review [Vol, 70:285 
financing, narrowly defined by the decreei were not subject to the 
special authorization requirement and were thus free. These special 
categories included loans from abroad to finance services rendered 
abroad or commercial transactions between France and foreign 
countries, 18 loans from abroad to certain banks and finance com-
panies, 19 and loans from abroad to a borrower in France, as long as 
that borrower's cumulative total of such loans outstanding remained 
less than 2 million francs.20 
A parallel regulation, Decree Number 67-82, required the prior 
submission to the Ministry of Industry of all contracts calling for the 
acquisition of, or the obtaining of a license for the use of, industrial-
property rights by French residents from foreign sources.21 The 
Ministry, in turn, was empowered to study the technical and finan-
cial terms of the agreement as well as the probable effect on the 
development of French technology and to render a favorable or 
unfavorable opinion within forty days. While the legal effect of an 
unfavorable opinion was never clear-as the decree was not pub-
lished pursuant to general exchange control regulations, nor were 
any special sanctions provided-parties acting without the Ministry's 
approval might anticipate difficulties with tax and customs author-
ities, 22 who were automatically notified whenever an unfavorable 
opinion was rendered. The purpose of the decree was not only to 
ensure that royalty payments abroad were not being made as a device 
to reduce French taxes but also to put the entire area of the licensing 
of industrial-property rights by nonresidents under local surveillance 
and control. It was hoped that French companies could be discour-
aged from taking foreign licenses-with their adverse effect upon the 
balance of payments and the development of local technology-
when there were alternative French sources of supply. 
B. Reimposition of Exchange Controls 
In the past three years there have been several modifications in 
this regulatory scheme. By far the most important of these changes 
has been the reimposition of exchange controls. Following the finan-
cial crisis of 1968 in France, there was fear that devaluation of the 
18. Decree No. 67-78 of Jan. 27, 1967, art. 6(2), [1967] J.O. 1073, [1967] D.S.L. 81. 
19. Id. art. 6(3). 
20. Id. art. 6(4). 
21. Decree No. 67-82 of Jan. 27, 1967, [1967] J.O. 1081, [1967] D.S.L. 83, later 
implemented by Arrete (departmental regulation) of the Ministry of Industry, March 
6, 1967, [1967] J.q. 3173, [1967] D.S.L. 173. 
22. For further discussion of these difficulties, see Torem &: Craig, supra note 1, at 
691-92. 
December 1971] Foreign Investment in France 289 
franc might become necessary. Under this pressure, the government 
issued Decree Number 68-1021 on November 24, 1968,23 which re-
imposed exchange controls in substantially the same form as before 
1967. 
Once again, all exchange transactions, movements of capital, and 
payments of all types between residents- and nonresidents of France 
were required.to be- channeled through intermediaires agrees,24 or 
authorized intermediary banks. These banks, which are listed in a 
Ministry circular, 25 play an essential role in the effectuation of ex-
change controls since they act as agents of the government pursuant 
to a delegation of power. They control all transactions that are 
permitted under a "general authorization." General authorization 
was given in the decree of November 24, 1968, for certain kinds of 
current payments for imported goods, services rendered, royalties 
and license fees, rents, interest, dividends, research and engineering 
exchanges, medical expenses, wages, insurance, taxes, inheritances, 
repayments of loans, and the like.26 All other payments by a resident 
to a nonresident were prohibited unless specific authorization was 
obtained from the Ministry of Finance.27 All imports in excess of 250 
francs and all exports in excess of 1,000 francs were required to be 
registered with an intermediaire.28 Claims of French residents held 
abroad or against nonresidents and derived from the export of goods 
and services, as well as income earned by residents abroad or from 
nonresidents, had to be repatriated.29 The amount of money that 
could be carried by French residents on trips outside France was also 
strictly limited and policed.30 
The reimposition of exchange controls was designed as a purely 
monetary measure to support the currency. It was announced as both 
extraordinary and temporary,31 but, as previous exchange controls 
23. [1968] J.O. 11081, [1968] D.S.L. 325. 
24. Id. arts. 1-2. 
25. Arr~t~ of the Ministry of Finance, Aug. 26, 1969, [1969] J.O. 8642. 
26. Decree No. 68-1021 of Nov. 24, 1968, art. 2, [1968) J.O. 11082, [1968) D.SL. 325. 
27. Id. art. 6. 
28. Ministry of Finance Circulars of Nov. 24, 1968, [1968) J.O. 11087, [1968) D.S.L. 
327: Nov. 25, 1968, [1968) J.O. 11105, [1968] D.S.L. 327: Nov. 27, 1968, [1968] J.O. 11171, 
[1968] D.S.L. 330. 
29. Decree No. 68-1021 of Nov. 24, 1968, art. 6, [1968] J.O. 11082, [1968] D.S.L. 325. 
30. Arr~t~ of the Ministry of Finance, Nov. 24, 1968, [1968] J.O. 11085, [1968] 
D.S.L. ll27; Dec. 31, 1968, [1969] J.O. 39, [1969) D.S.L. 36; April 11, 1969, [1969) J.O. 
3592, [1969] D.S.L •. 159; Dec. 23, 1969, [1969) J .0. 12578, [1970) D.S.L. 15; April 28, 
1970, [1970] J.O. 4029, [1970) D.SL. 121; Aug. 4, 1970, [1970] J.O. 7410, [1970) D.S.L. 223. 
lll. See International Herald Tribune, June 6, 1968, at 9. 
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lasted for nearly thirty years in France (from 1939 to 1967),32 it may 
be doubted whether the new controls will be rapidly dismantled. 
C. Changes in the Investment and Loan Control Mechanism 
Many of the recent changes in the procedures for clearance of 
direct investments and loans to borrowers in France are either adap-
tations related to the reimposition of exchange controls or clarifica-
tions required by practical experience with the regime erected in 
1967. These changes left the basic dichotomy between direct invest-
ments and borrowings33 intact and constituted, for the most part, 
refinements of these categories. The impact of the changes has been 
to subject all foreign direct investments and loans to added exchange 
control procedures. Loan and guarantee controls were also modified 
so as to maximize the favorable contribution of foreign loans to the 
French balance of payments and to minimize the possibility that 
outstanding foreign loans could be liquidated at times of currency 
crisis and thus weaken the position of the franc. The direct invest-
ment regulations were altered in minor fashion to be consistent with 
the exchange controls and, in theory, to free from control direct 
investments originating from other Common Market countries. 
While this modification was substantial in form, it will be shown 
that, because of parallel changes in exchange controls, there has been 
no significant liberation from French government control of direct 
investments in France-even investments originating from within 
the Common Market. 
I. Loans and Guarantees 
In October 1969, a Ministry of Finance circular was devoted to 
clarifying the law on guarantees given in favor of French companies 
by nonresidents,34 which have the effect of permitting the French 
company privileged access to franc-financing on the local French 
market. The circular deals with guarantees given by related foreign 
32. Investment controls began with Decree of Sept. 9, 1939, [1939] J .0. 11266, [1939] 
D.P. IV. 412, and ended (temporarily) with Law No. 66-1008 of Dec, 28, 1966, [1966] 
J.O. 11621, [1967] D.S.L. 30. 
33. See text accompanying note 17 supra. 
34. Circular of the Ministry of Finance of Oct. 15, 1969, [1969] J.O. 10662, [1969] 
D.S.L. 388, clarifying Decree No. 69-264 of March 21, 1969, art. 1, [1969] J.O. 3066, 
[1969] D.S.L. 139, amending Decree No. 67-78 of Jan. 27, 1967, art. 3, [1967] J.O. 1073, 
[1967] D.S.L. 81, and Arrete of the Ministry of Finance of March 21, 1969, [1969] J.O. 
3067, [1969] D.S.L. 140, amending art. 1 and abrogating art. 2 of Arrete of Jan. 27, 1967, 
[1967] J.O. 1074, [1967] D.S.L. 82. See Circular of the Ministry of Finance of March 21, 
1969 (relative to investments), tit. I, pt. II, [1969] J.O. 3067, [1969] D.S.L. 140, 
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corporations (sister and parent) as well as with guarantees by unre-
lated entities. 
The question of the treatment of guarantees by related corpora-
tions had earlier been in doubt. These guarantees were not foreign 
loans and therefore were not subject to the prior-authorization pro-
cedure. It could be argued that in many cases such guarantees do not 
per se constitute an increase of control, and hence should not be 
subject to direct-investment procedures. The new circular makes 
clear that all guarantees by related foreign companies (including 
guarantees by foreign banks based on guarantees by related com-
panies and guarantees by other French related companies) shall be 
treated as direct investments and shall be subject to the prior-declara-
tion procedure.36 This means that such guarantees are subject to 
ajournement, or government veto, and that if no action is taken by 
the Ministry within sixty days the declarant may proceed to make 
the guarantee in question. 
An exception to the direct-investment treatment for related guar-
antees is provided, however, for guarantees that meet the following 
three criteria: (1) the loan guaranteed must be motivated by the 
normal operations of the borrowing concern and must not be used 
by it for purposes amounting to an investment; (2) the aggregate of 
all outstanding advances and credits, including the one in question, 
must not exceed the aggregate of the borrower's stated capital, re-
serves, undistributed profits, and long-term advances from abroad, 
repayable after the advances in question; and (3) the aggregate 
amount of the planned loan, plus all previously guaranteed loans to 
the same firm, must not exceed 2 million francs.36 Guarantees 
meeting these criteria are "free" ( i.e., no prior declaration is re-
quired), but proof that these conditions are met must be given to an 
intermediaire before the guarantee is executed and an accounting 
must be made to the Treasury within twenty days after its execu-
tion.37 
Guarantees given by nonresidents other than corporations of the 
same group are subject to the requirements for direct investments if 
such guarantees give control of the borrowing firm to the guar-
antor.88 All other guarantees are subject to the rules on loans and 
35. Circular of the Ministry of Finance of Oct. 15, 1969, tit. II, art. I(l), [1969] 
J.O. 10662-63, [1969] D.S.L. 388. 
36. Id. tit. II, art. I(2)(B). 
37. Id. tit. II, art. 1(3). 
38. Id. tit. II, art. II. 
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must receive a special authorization, unless the loan itself could be 
made without authorization, as described below. 
As to loans themselves, Decree Number 67-78 had exempted 
from the prior-authorization procedure those borrowings that 
amounted to direct investments and were the subject of a prior 
declaration.39 In addition, Decree Number 67-78 had exempted from 
authorization the following transactions: (I) loans from abroad to 
finance services rendered abroad or commercial transactions between 
France and foreign countries or between foreign countries; (2) loans 
to certain banks and finance companies; and (3) loans from abroad, 
as long as the borrower did not have a cumulative total of more than 
2 million francs of such loans outstanding. 40 
Decree Number 69-264 of March 21, 1969, restricted the second 
category above by requiring that a borrower also be an intermediaire 
agree (i.e., an authorized bank) and struck out all the other condi-
tions of exemption, authorizing the Ministry to provide them by 
circular.41 The ministerial circular of the same date essentially re-
created the exempt categories with modifications.42 The first category 
above was limited to loans to industrial enterprises for the financing 
of operations performed abroad, to enterprises of any kind for the 
financing of imports into France or exports from France, and to 
brokerage houses for the financing of international operations.43 To 
the 2 million franc maximum of the third category the circular 
added several new conditions: that the interest not be higher than 
the normal market rate, that the total amount of the loan be realized 
from the sale of foreign exchange or from the debit of a foreign franc 
account, and that full documentation be provided to an inter-
mediaire agree and forwarded by it to the Treasury, together with a 
compte-rendu (an accounting), within twenty days.44 
The latter two categories were again modified by circular on July 
24, 1970. This circular required for both categories that the loans be 
expressed in a foreign currency and, when the corresponding franc 
value of the loan was put at the disposition of the borrower, that an 
interval of at least one year separate each repayment installment, 
that prepayment must not be permitted, and that, if renewal is 
39. Decree No. 67-78 of Jan. 27, 1967, art. 6(1), [1967] J.O. 1074, [1967] D.S.L, 81. 
40. Id. art. 6(2)•(4). 
41. Decree No. 69-264 of March 21, 1969, art. 1, [1.969] J.O. 3066, [1969] D.S.L, 189, 
amending Decree No. 67-78 of Jan. 27, 1967, art. 6, [1967] J.O. 1074, [1967] D,S.L, 81. 
42. See Circular of the Ministry of Finance of March 21, 1969 (relative to loans), 
tit. I, [1969] J.O. 3068, [1969] D.SL. 140. 
43. Id. tit. I(A). 
44. Id. tit. I(B). 
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allowed, it must be for at least one year.45 The apparent purpose of 
these provisions is to encourage-or at least to permit-recourse to 
the international financial market for relatively long-term loans with 
stable terms. At the same time, short-term, "call" financing, which 
may have an unstable effect on the French economy and balance of 
payments in times of stress, is discouraged. Much financing of sub-
sidiaries by foreign parents takes place pursuant to the provisions 
of this exception; and when special authorizations are required for 
larger loans to subsidiaries on conditions similar to those that would 
qualify a small loan under this exception, the authorization is usu-
ally granted. It is realized that such financing frequently takes the 
place of new contributions to equity and is equally stable. At the 
same time, these guidelines hinder resort to "thin" capitalization and 
overreliance on borrowing. 
The circular of March 21, 1969, also ·detailed the duties of inter-
mediaires, pursuant to the 1968 exchange regulations, in handling 
the repayment of loans.46 They were instructed to require evidence 
that the loans in question had been regularly contracted within the 
requirements of the law and that all the proper documents had been 
filed before transmitting the repayment. The necessity for a regu-
lated exchange transaction at the time of repayment was thus used 
to enforce the regulations on loans. This circular further provided 
that the repayment of loans exempt from authorization could be 
freely postponed subject only to notification of the Treasury, but 
that prepayments could not be made without prior approval of the 
Treasury unless expressly provided for in the loan contract.47 In the 
case of loans that required administrative authorization, no changes 
whatever could be made in the payment schedule without the prior 
consent of the Treasury.48 , 
The March 1969 circular, together with an arrete (departmental 
regulation) of the same date,49 made it clear that comptes-rendus are 
required to be furnished to the Treasury within twenty days after 
45. Circular of the Ministry of Finance of July 24, 1970, [1970) J.O. 7038, [1970) 
D.S.L. 218, amending Circular of the Ministry of Finance of March 21, 1969 (relative 
to loans), tit. 1(2), [1969) J.O. 3068, [1969] D.S.L. 140. 
46. Circular of the Ministry of Finance of March 21, 1969 (relative to loans), tit. 
II(l), [1969] J.O. 3069, [1969] D.S.L. 140. 
47. Id. tit. II(2). After the circular of the Ministry of Finance of July 24, 1970, 
[1970) J.O. 7038, [1970] D.S.L. 218, the loan contract could not contain a prepayment 
clause and still be exempt from the prior-authorization requirement. 
48. Circular of the Ministry of Finance of March 21, 1969, tit. Il(2), [1969] J.O. 
3069, [1969] D.S.L. 140. 
49. Arrl!te of the Ministry of Finance, March 21, 1969, [1969] J.O. 3067, [1969] D.S.L. 
140. 
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the execution of all loans exempted from authorization by the terms 
of ministerial circulars as well as after execution of all loans that 
required authorization.50 A compte-rendu must also be made within 
twenty days of the repayment of any loan whatsoever. 
2. Direct Investments 
The first change affecting investments came in March 1969 with 
a decree making the liquidation of French investments abroad sub-
ject to prior declaration and the Ministry's right to require post-
ponement.51 Prior to this decree, the liquidation of both French in-
vestments abroad and foreign investments in France could be carried 
out freely, with only subsequent notice to the Ministry within 
twenty days.52 This rule remains unchanged for foreign investments 
in France. However, under the exchange control regulations, the 
funds resulting from the liquidation of a foreign investment in 
France cannot, in fact, be transferred abroad until supporting docu-
ments are presented to the Treasury through the intermediaire and 
an affirmative response is received.63 The apparent purpose of this 
procedure is to verify the "reality of the transaction," i.e., to ensure 
that it was, in fact, the liquidation of a legitimate prior investment. 
In June 1969, a Ministry of Finance circular made a special 
dispensation for liquidations involving less than 1 million £rancs.n4 
In such cases, the intermediaire would be licensed to transfer the 
liquidation proceeds without awaiting the Treasury's response to 
the supporting documents filed with the bank to justify the liquida-
tion. 
Although these changes were minor and reflected the necessity 
of stricter protection of the French balance-of-payments position, a 
much more drastic change in the fabric of direct-investment con-
trols was made in February 1971 when, in settlement of a 1969 law 
suit instituted by the EEC Commission against France before the 
European Court of Justice,55 France amended its direct-investment 
50. Id.; Circular of the Ministry of Finance of March 21, 1969, tit. I(B)(3), [1969] 
J.O. 3069, [1969] D.S.L. 140. 
51. Decree No. 69-264 of March 21, 1969, art. 1, [1969] J.O. 3066, [1969] D.S.L, 139. 
52. See Decree No. 67-78 of Jan. 27, 1967, arts. 3(2) &: 4(2), [1967] J.O. 1073, [1967] 
D.S.L. 81. 
53. Circular of the Ministry of Finance of March 21, 1969, [1969] J.O. 3067, [1969] 
D.S.L. 140. 
54. Circular of the Ministry of Finance of June 13, 1969, [1969] J.O. 60!i0, [1969] 
D.S.L. 260, as modified, Circular of the Ministry of Finance of Sept. 8, 1970, [1970] 
J.O. 8632. 
55. See pt. III. B. infra. 
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controls to exempt direct investments between France and other 
Common Market countries. The amending decree stated that the 
prior-declaration procedures for direct investments shall not apply 
to 
the constitution or the liquidation of direct investments in a me~-
ber country of the European Economic Community other than 
France by French domiciliaries [ressortissants] whether natural per-
sons, companies or establishments, nor to operations relative to the 
constitution in France of direct investments by domiciliaries [res-
sortissants] whether physical persons, companies or establishments 
of a member country of the European Economic Community other 
than France.56 
It should be noted that, on its face, this liberalization is vast 
indeed, for not only does it free direct investment in France by 
nationals of the other EEC countries, but it also quite clearly frees 
direct investment made by a corporation duly established in a mem-
ber country, even though that corporation is itself under foreign-
possibly American-control. 57 Since, as will be described below, 68 
it is just this "Trojan Horse" problem that has been at the root 
of France's prior refusals to relax its direct investment rules with 
respect to intra-Common Market investments, it might be thought 
that this modification was significant indeed. Such was not the case, 
however, for on the same day that it relaxed its intra-EEC direct-
investment controls, France tightened its exchange controls so as to 
subject to government authorization practically all the investment 
operations simultaneously liberated from the direct-investment con-
trols. Under this new exchange control regulation, all direct invest-
ments-including those made from within the Common Market 
-are subject to the making of a prior declaration.59 Then, the 
regulation continues, when these operations 
are susceptible of causing a movement of capital, their realization 
requires a prior authorization from the Minister of Finance, and the 
"prior declaration" shall serve as a request for such an authorization. 
In other cases, and reserving the provisions of Decree No. 67-78 of 
January 27, 1967, the declaration serves statistical purposes.60 
56. Decree No. 71-143 of Feb. 22, 1971, [1971] J.O. 1832, [1971] D.S.L. 128. 
57. This result is clear from the meaning of the term ressortissant as applied to a 
corporation. See text accompanying notes 84-88 infra. 
58. See text accompanying notes 85-104 infra. 
59. Decree No. 71-144 of Feb. 22, 1971, [1971] J.O. 1832, [1971] D.S.L. 128, modifying 
the exchange control regulation, Decree No. 68-1021 of Nov. 24, 1968, (1968] J.O. 11081, 
[1968] D.SL. 325. 
60. Decree No. 71-144 of Feb. 22, 1971, art. 4, [1971] J.O. 1832, [1971] D.S.L. 128. 
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The import of these nvo modifications taken together is that, 
with respect to intra-Common Market investment, France has given 
. up its specific veto power under the direct-investment regulations 
only to require a specific government authorization under the ex-
change control regulations when a direct investment gives rise to 
a capital movement.01 Since the essence of foreign direct investment 
is the transfer of foreign capital, the "liberation" of intra-Com-
munity investment is largely illusory.62 As to direct investments from 
outside the Common Market, the regime in practice remains the 
same: either the direct investment gives rise to a movement of 
capital, in which case it is subject to the requirement of a prior 
authorization as set forth above, or it does not, in which case the 
government still retains its right to impose a "postponement" (which 
can become permanent) pursuant to the provisions on direct in-
vestment in Decree Number 67-78. 
While the over-all impact of these modifications is not sub-
stantial, there are some direct investments not giving rise to capital 
transfers that, insofar as intra-Common Market investment is con-
cerned, are newly liberated. In particular, the expansion of French 
corporations controlled by domiciliaries of another Common Market 
country is no longer subject to authorization unless a capital trans-
fer is required. Under prior law, every purchase or creation of a 
new plant or facility constituted a direct investment subject to 
government veto.63 Now it would appear that as long as such French 
company expansion-including, apparently, even the acquisition of 
other French corporations-is financed within France, without a 
capital movement from abroad and without a guarantee given from 
abroad to French lenders, the government retains no power to im-
pose a veto.64 All this is, at most, a very small opening in the wall 
of controls. 
It further appears that with respect to third-country investment 
61. One result of the change of the regulatory basis for controlling foreign investment 
might be that the specific sixty-day "statute of limitations" given to the government to 
request an "ajournement" of an investment under the foreign investment regulations 
(Decree No. 67-78 of Jan. 27, 1967, art. (4)(1), [1967] J.O. 1073, [1967] D.S.L. 81) need no 
longer be respected, a11d the government may refrain from issuing an authorization for 
as·long as it deems fit. · 
62. This is true even without considering the expansive interpretations that could 
conceivably !le given by the Ministry of Finance to the term, "susceptible of causing a 
movement of capital," in the regulation. 
63. Decree No. 67-78 of Jan. 27, 1967, art. 2(3)(B), [1967) J.O. 1073, [1967) D.S.L. 
81. See Torem 8: Craig, mpra note l, at 686. 
64. Note, however, that if local expansion is financed either by foreign loans, or 
by foreign loans or local loans guaranteed by nonresidents, the transaction is subject 
to regulation. See pt. II. C. I. supra. 
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the government has· reserved the right to apply the ajournement 
powers of direct investment Decree Number 67-78 even in those 
cas~s in which the direct investment does not cause a capital flow, 
or in which the extension of a controlled· French · corporatiox:i is 
financed locally or out of earnings. This is because, in the case of 
extra-Community investments, the government can rely on· its direct-
investment ajournement procedure as well as on the power to deny 
exchange control authorization. · 
D. Indus~rial Property Rights Contracts 
Decree Number 67-82 of January 27, 1967,65 which provided for 
the prior submission of all contracts with nonresidents involving the 
assignment of any industrial property rights, including technical, 
scientific, and engineering assistance, for ministerial review and opin-
ion:, was abrogated and replaced on May 26, 1970, by Decree Num-
ber 70-441. 66 The new decree makes no provision for an opinion 
or other expression of approval or disapproval on the part of the 
Ministry of Industry; rather it simply requires the filing of all such 
contracts with the Ministry after they have been executed. A num-
ber is then assigned to each contract; this number is to be used by 
the intermediaire in clearing license fees or royalties for transactions 
abroad. The immediate reason for this change was the objection 
by the EEC Commission67 that this French control of contracts in-
volving industrial property rights contravened the provisions ·of the 
Treaty of Rome (EEC Treaty)68 when applied to intra-Common 
Market contracts. After receiving a formal complaint .by the Com-
mission, France decided to liberalize the regulations for all, in-
cluding American and other third-country licensors. On a broader 
plane, the revision represents a retreat from the attempts to regu-
late and influence private industry in acquiring foreign licenses 
and technology. It may be surmised that the prior efforts of the 
government to influence industrial policy by this contract mech-
anism were not sufficiently rewarded by positive results. The present 
filing procedure provides a mechanism that will permit the govern-
ment to verify that royalty or other such payments made abroad are 
65. [1967] J.O. 1081, [1967) D.S.L. 83, later implemented by Arrete of the Ministry 
of Industry, March 6, 1967, [1967] J.O. 3173, [1967] D.S.L. 173. 
66. [1970] J.O. 4991, [1970] D.S.L. 129. 
67. 13 E.E.C. J.O. No. C 3/3 (1970) (response of Dec. 8; 1969, to a Parliamentary 
question of Nov. 13, 1967). 
68. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Done at Rome March 
25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter EEC Treaty]. ·· · • 
298 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 70:285 
bona fide and to ensure that neither exchange controls nor taxes 
are evaded. 
E. Monetary Regulations Afjecting Investment and Financing 
The modifications of French exchange and investment controls 
during the period 1968 through 1970 as described above reflected in 
large part a desire to protect the franc from stronger currencies, par-
ticularly the American dollar. By August 1971, however, the dollar 
itself was in difficulty because of the ever increasing United States 
balance-of-payments deficit. In order to avoid outright dollar deval-
uation, on August 15 President Nixon imposed a ten per cent sup• 
plemental duty on all imports into the United States00 and denied 
any further obligation to convert dollars into gold at the demand of 
foreign holders.70 United States government representatives inti-
mated a willingness to negotiate removal of the ten per cent 
surcharge on a selective basis with foreign governments that "co-
operated" in solving the international monetary crisis.71 It was the 
intention of this American policy to force selective revaluation of 
stronger currencies, while leaving intact the exchange ratios between 
the dollar and weaker currencies. 72 
The flow of more and more dollars into a few strong currency 
countries brought about significant pressures for revaluation. In 
most European countries, as well as in Japan, these pressures suc-
ceeded in causing the governments to permit their currencies to 
"float" in relation to the dollar.73 The initial upward movement of 
these strong currencies in relation to the dollar, if not constituting 
a definitive revaluation, did momentarily ease the pressure for out• 
right devaluation of the dollar. 
France, however, was not ready to permit the general float or 
revaluation of the franc that could have impaired its long struggle 
69. Presidential Proclamation No. 4074 of Aug. 16, 1971, CCH BALANCE OF PAY?>mNTS 
REP., 11 9070 (1971). 
70. See Policy Guideline in President's Economic Program, released by White House 
Press Secretary, Aug. 15, 1971, CCH BALANCE OF PAYllmNTS REP., 11 9073 (1971): Press 
Conference of Treasury Secretary John M. Connally of Aug. 15, 1971, CCH BALANCE 
OF PAYl.mNTs REP., 11 9072 (1971) [hereinafter Press Conference]. 
71. See Press Conference, supra note 70, at 9149. 
72. The policy has proven in part to be successful. On December 19, 1971, the In-
ternational Monetary Fund approved a new set of exchange rates negotiated by the 
Group of Ten, which effectuate a devaluation of the dollar and a revaluation of most 
of the other leading currencies. In addition the United States agreed to remove the 
10% import surcharge. N.Y. Times, Dec. 20, 1971, at 1, col. 8. 
73. See International Herald Tribune, Aug. 21·22, 1971, at 1, cols. 7-8 ("float" of 
currencies of Germany, Belgium, Netherlands); Aug. 23, at I, col. 8 (Italy and U.K.); 
Aug. 27, at 7, coL 2 (Switzerland); Aug. 30, at 1, col. 8 ijapan). 
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to attain a positive trade balance. Accordingly, it instituted a com-
plicated double exchange market made up of the "commercial 
franc," with an official dollar parity maintained by the government, 
and the "financial franc," which was to be allowed to float.74 The 
commercial franc was basically to be used for the payment of im-
ports and exports,75 and. by maintaining the existing parity it was 
intended that French exports should not become more expensive to 
foreign buyers. The financial franc was intended to cover all other 
transactions in France, including investments and financings by for-
eign residents as well as tourist expenditures. 
The initial results were satisfactory from the French point of 
view. While the commercial franc remained pegged at 5.5 francs to 
the dollar, the financial franc floated and in the first few months of 
liberation the effective revaluation never exceeded three to four 
per cent. The complexity of the double exchange system was such 
that only France, with its long tradition of exchange and investment 
controls, attempted to use it as a method of preventing a general 
revaluation that would have hurt its trade position. The two-tiered 
system-and the very narrow uses of the commercial franc-had the 
effect of making foreign expenditures in France, such as investment, 
financing and even tourism, more expensive and hence, to some de-
gree, less attractive. 
The success of this system depended in part on limitation of the 
differential between the commercial franc and the financial franc. 
Accordingly, parallel measures were taken to limit-at least tempo-
rarily-the accumulation of dollars in France. These ad hoc mea-
sures, adopted informally in early November 1971, included the 
application of existing investment controls so as to limit foreign 
investments that would require the input of large amounts of dollars 
on the French exchange markets,76 and the modification of existing 
trade controls so as to require the rapid payment for imports, thus 
forcing importers to purchase dollars and other foreign currencies 
to pay trade balances.77 This latter provision was intended to prevent 
74. International Herald Tribune, Aug. 21-22, 1971, at 1, cols. 7-8; at 9, cols. 2-4. 
75. Circular of the Ministry of Finance of Aug. 20, 1971, [1971] J.O. 8313 ("Circulaire 
relative a l'execution des transferts a destination de l'etranger''), [1971] D.S.L. 349 
(payment for imports at commercial franc exchange rate); Circular of the Ministry of 
Finance of Aug. 20, 1971, [1971] J.O. 8313 ("Circulaire relative au rapatriement et a 
la cession sur les marches des changes de creances sur l'etranger ou sur des non-resi-
dents detenues par des residents et a Ia cession du produit d'operations en capital ou 
d'emprunt avec l'etranger''), [1971] D.S.L. 349 (procedure for repatriating proceeds of 
export sales). 
76. See pt. IV. C. 1. a. infra. 
77. Circular of the Ministry of Finance of Aug. 20, 1971, [1971] J.O. 8314, [1971] 
D.S.L. 349 (time delays for payments of imports). 
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speculation by importers on the eventual revaluation of the franc 
that would itself cause a pressure for revaluation. The regulation 
required not only payment for all imports within ninety days of 
the merchandise clearing customs, but also the immediate payment 
of all past due import balances.78 This last provision had particular 
effect on French subsidiaries of foreign companies that had over 
long periods built up large balances owing to parent companies from 
which the subsidiaries had imported merchandise. These unpaid 
balances really amounted to long term debts, which were frequently 
replaced by the subsidiaries with local franc financing. The pur-
chase of dollars· resulting from implementation of the regulation 
temporarily mitigated pressures for further increases in the value 
of the floating franc. The fate of these informal measures is less 
clear now that a major monetary agreement has been reached. 
III. FRENCH INVESTMENT CONTROLS IN THE COMMON 
MARKET CONTEXT 
A. General Considerations 
French direct-investment regulations, as supplemented by the 
exchange controls and the recent modifications described above, 
are the most severe of any country in the Common Market. Indeed, 
the formal structure of foreign-investment regulations may con-
stitute the highwater mark of regulation of foreign investment in 
the developed countries, with the exception of Japan. Such a struc-
ture causes stresses within the Common Market, which is dedicated 
to complete freedom of intra-Community investment and which, 
until now, has had a very liberal policy toward receiving third-
country investment within the Market. We will examine first the 
problems created by the application by France of its controls to 
investments in France by other member countries, and then, more 
generally, the political and economic forces at work within the Com-
mon Market in developing a joint policy toward third-country for-
eign investment. 
B. Intra-Common Market Investment 
The basic economic principle of the Common Market is the 
elimination of barriers to the flow of goods, workers, services, and 
capital among the member countries.79 Although the abolition of 
78. Id., art. 4 B. The payment for materials imported in the past was to be made 
within thirty days ·of publication of the circular. 
79. See EEC Treaty arts. 9-37 (goods); arts. 48-51 (workers); arts. 52-66 (establishment 
and supply of services); arts. 67-73 (capital). 
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such barriers was envisioned. to take place .over a period of years,_ 
the end of the transitional period was formally fixed as December 
31, 1969;80 by that date freedom from customs barriers and residence 
formalities had largely been achieved.81 
Article 67 of the EEC Treaty provides: 
During the transitional period, Member States shall, insofar as may 
be necessary to ensure the proper functioning of the Common Mar-
ket, progressively abolish between themselves restrictions on the 
movement of capital belonging to persons resident in Member States 
and any discrimination based on the nationality or the place of 
residence of the parties or on the place where such capital is invested. 
While directives issued under the Treaty permit the use of exchange 
controls and the verification of monetary flows between member 
countries, they contemplate that such verifications shall be routine 
and shall not constitute an occasion for the exercise of discretion 
by the receiving country in determining whether or not to permit 
the investment.82 
It is obvious that the basic French investment controls, which are 
based not on the control of foreign exchange but on the control 
of foreign investment itself, contradict these directives. Further, and 
more importantly, the French regulations contravene the basic rights 
of establishment guaranteed by the EEC Treaty.83 
Despite lengthy negotiations benveen the French government 
and the EEC Commission, France continued to insist on its right to 
impose the 1967 ·investment procedures on investments entering 
from member countries, although it did concede that it did not have 
the right to refuse investments originating from bona fide domicil-
iaries of member countries.84 Failing satisfactory resolution of the 
problem, the Commission served on the French government, on 
April 17, 1969, an avis motive, or formal complaint, requesting the 
termination of the application of direct-investment procedures to 
80. Article 8 of the Treaty fixed a period of twelve years as the transitional period, 
with a possible extension for three additional years. See Rambow, The End of the 
Transitional Period, 6 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 434 (1969). 
81. See [COMMUNmES] COMMISSION, THIRD GENERAL REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF 
THE COMMUNmES 1969, at 15-17 (1970); [COMMUNmES] COMMISSION, SECOND GENERAL 
REPORT ON THE AcnvmES OF THE COMMUNffiES 1968, at 21-22 (1969); ter Heide, The 
Free Movement of Workers in the Final Phase, 6 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 466 (1969). 
82. As of 1960, Member States were to "grant all exchange authorizations required 
for the completion or execution of d~rect investments." First and Second Directives 
for Implementation of Treaty, art. 67, I CCH CoMM. MKT. REP. 1111 1651-67 (May 11, 
1960). 
83. See EEC Treaty arts. 52-53, 67. 
84. Letter from French Government to EEC Commission of July 10, 1968, cited in 
"Affaire 66/69: Rapport d'Audience par le Juge Rapporteur Riccardo Monaco" (Lux-
embourg, Oct. 14, 1970 (mimeo)). 
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member countries.85 Compliance was requested within forty-five 
days, with the proviso that extensions could be granted, upon re-
quest, if needed to obtain the necessary Parliamentary authoriza-
tions. France did not comply with the Commission's request and, 
on November 10, 1969, the Commission took the procedural steps 
required by Article 169 of the EEC Treaty to bring litigation before 
the European Court of Justice. 
In the proceedings before that Court the Commission attacked 
-without too much opposition-the mechanism of the French 
direct-investment regulations that required the filing of a declara-
tion for intra-Community direct investment in France even when 
there was no movement of capital.86 It likewise attacked the reserved 
veto power-the droit d'ajournement-which was alleged to con-
stitute an unlawful discrimination against nationals and domicil-
iaries of member countries other than France, since this veto power 
was not applicable to investments in France made by French nation-
als and domiciliaries.87 
The key issue of the proceeding, however, turned on the correct 
interpretation of Article 221 of the Treaty, which provides: 
Within three years of this treaty coming into force, Member States 
shall permit the nationals [ressortissants] of other Member States to 
participate financially in the capital of firms or companies, as defined 
in Article 58, in the same manner as their mm nationals. This shall 
be ·without prejudice to the other provisions of this Treaty. 
In its avis motive, and in its pleadings before the Court of 
Justice, the Commission took the position that the right of estab-
lishment is given by the Treaty to corporations constituted under 
the law of other member countries and that a host country has no 
right to investigate the control of that corporation from the point 
of view of either the origin of its capital or the nationality of its 
management. 88 Finally, the Commission argued that the origin of 
the capital that is to be transferred may not itself be investigated 
85. EUROPE, No. 319 (n.s.), April 22, 1969, at 7. See also E.E.C. J.O. No. C 3/14 (1970) 
(Commission response to a Parliamentary question of Oct. 27, 1969). 
86. All information regarding the proceedings in the European Court of Justice 
are taken from the official document of the European Court of Justice entitled 
"Affaire 66/69: Rapport d'Audience par le Juge Rapporteur Riccardo Monaco" 
(Luxembourg, Oct. 14, 1970 (mimeo)) [hereinafter Rapport]. 
87. Rapport, supra note 86, at 3. 
88. The Commission based its argument on the EEC Treaty, art. 58, which provides: 
Companies and firms [societes] formed in accordance with the law of a Member 
State and having their registered office, central administration or principal place 
of business within the Community shall, for the purpose of applying the provisions 
of this chapter, be treated in the same way as individual nationals ot Member 
States. 
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since it is the intention of the. Treaty to favor the free transfer 
of capital within the Community in the same manner as it favors 
the transfer of goods and services. 89 
The French defense was based upon its consistent diplomatic 
position: while it was willing to receive freely investment from mem-
ber countries, it was not willing to consider as a member-country 
investment one that comes through a Dutch, German, or Italian 
corporation dominated by interests from outside the Community.90 
France thus retains the right to scrutinize the pedigree of the 
corporate investor and to decide whether it should be treated as 
a national of a member country. The French government has even 
suggested that a common Community policy toward the problem 
of corporate control be adopted in order to trace more effectively 
the movements of capital from third countries, including capital 
that transits through a member country before being invested in 
another member country.91 
In the proceedings before the European Court of Justice, there-
fore, the French government contested the Commission's applica-
tion of the term "nationals [ressortissants] of other Member States" 
to corporations that might be formed in accordance with the law 
of a Member State and have their registered offices or places of bus-
iness within such state, as set forth in Article 58, but that might 
in fact only be subsidiaries of foreign (third-country) corporations. 
It pointed out that a Treaty interpretation that would require a 
Member State to give "national" treatment to such a corporation 
was unacceptable to a Member State that might feel itself menaced 
by third-country investment.92 In such cases, the Member State 
would be forced into a position of either complete laissez-faire on 
the one hand or total economic dirigisme on the other hand (i.e., to 
control the investments of its own nationals and only then to be 
able to control that of foreigners as well). Accordingly, the French 
argued that the rights of such corporations must be limited to the 
narrowest right of establishment (as provided in Article 52)93 and 
could not be extended to the right to invest. 
89. The Commission here relied on art. 67 of the EEC Treaty, set out in text 
following note 81 supra. 
90. During the negotiation of the EEC Treaty, France had apparently wanted to 
put into the Treaty provisions covering third-country controlled corporations, but 
nothing was done about the French proposal. See Scholten, Company Law in Europe, 
4 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 377, 386 (1967). 
91. Rapport, supra note 86, at 8. 
92. Id. at 7. 
93. Art. 52 provides: 
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· ·1n fact, the definition of Community corporations entitled to 
national treatment, as required by Article 58,84 has long bothered 
French jurists. As early as 1959, Professor Loussouarn, a leading 
French expert on international corporate law, wrote: 
It is thus seen that Article 58 of the Treaty of Rome seems to show 
a too great liberalism. Its application to the letter risks considering 
as nationals of the Community companies which, while having their 
registered head office in the interior of the Community, are in 
reality controlled by managers who are nationals of countries which 
are not signatories of the Treaty of Rome. This danger can be 
avoided only if the application of the text is coordinated with existing 
national systems relative to the determination of the nationality of 
corporations. os 
Other commentators have tried by various far-fetched interpreta-
tions to establish that Article 58, when taken in conjunction with 
other provisions of the Treaty, 86 only applies to corporations that 
are established under the laws of a member country and that have 
a central place of business in such country.07 However, Article 58 
states that companies should be entitled to national treatment when 
they are formed in accordance with the law of a Member State and 
have "their registered head office, central administration or principal 
place of business within the Community."08 As Loussouarn points 
out in dismissing the subtle interpretation thus attempted: "When, 
in the French language, three words are separated-the first two 
by a comma and the second and third by the conjunction 'or'-that 
Within the framework of the provisions· set out below, restrictions on the 
freedom of establishment of nationals of a Member State in the territory of another 
Member State shall be abolished by progressive stages in the course of the transi• 
tional period. Such progressive abolition shall also apply to restrictions on the 
setting up of agencies, branches or subsidiaries by nationals of any Member State 
established in the territory of any Member State. . 
Freedom of establishment shall include the right to. engage in and carry on 
non-wage earning activities, to set up and manage undertakings and, in particular, 
firms and companies [societes] within the meaning of Article 58(2), under the condi-
tions laid down for its own nationals by the law of the country where such establish• 
ment is effected, subject to the provisions of the Chapter relating to capital. 
It is difficult to see how any effective right of establishment can exist without a right 
to invest. 
94. See note 88 supra. 
95. Loussouarn, La condition des personnes morales en droit international prive, 
96 REcUEIL DES CouRS 447, 489 (1959). 
96. Notably art. 52, set out in note 93 supra. 
97. See Chesne, L'Etablissement des Etrangers en France et la Communautd 
Economique Europeenne, in REVUE CRITIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE at 283 
(1959); Savatier, Le Marche Commun au Regard du Droit International Prive, in id. 
at 241. 
98. See art. 58, set out in note 88 supra (emphasis added). 
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excludes any possibility that two of. the three terms may be required 
cumulatively."99 
Nevertheless, the French government had already officially 
adopted, in another context, the position that something in addition 
to a registered head office is required for a corporation established 
under the laws of a Member State to be able to claim Treaty rights. 
The government took this position with respect to the issuance of 
the carte de commerfant, or commercial trader's card, required for 
foreigners to engage personally in business, to serve as the director 
of a foreign branch in France, or to serve as chairman or president 
of a French corporation.100 The necessity of obtaining this govern-
ment authorization, which has been alleged by some to serve as a 
discouragement to certain foreign implantations,101 would violate 
the Treaty's free-establishment provisions if applied to nationals -of 
Member States. A number of Commission directives have required 
the abrogation of such provisions.102 By Decree Number 69-815, 
France exempted nationals of Member States from the requirement 
of obtaining such an authorization for most kinds of commerce.103 
This decree provided, however, that with respect to performing com-
mercial services in France either for his own account, or for the 
account of another Common Market ressortissant (whether a corpora-
tion or a natural person), the exemption was available to a natural 
person only if he was a national of a Member State and was domi-
ciled in the territory of a Member State.10,1 A corporation having 
only a registered head office in the Community qualified for the 
exemption only if it "exercised an activity having an effective and 
continued connection with the economy of a Member State."105 The 
exact nature of this effective economic link with a Member State has 
not as yet been defined, either by statute or by case law. It would 
appear that, at the very least, this requirement would permit France 
to deny the carte de commerfant exemption to a "post office box" 
corporation of a Member State. 
99. Loussouarn, Les Societies et la Communaute Economique Europt!enne, 140 
REvUE DU MARCHE COMMUN 59, 62 (1971). 
100. See E. STEIN, HARMONIZATION OF EUROPEAN COMPANY LAWS 35 (1971). 
IOI. See Frank, La Carte de Commercant: An Example of Legal Restrictions on 
American Investment in France, 5 HARV. INTL. L. CLUB J. I (1963). 
102. First, Second &: Proposed Third Directives of the Council of the EEC, 1 CCH 
CoMllr. MKT. REP. 1111 1651-82 (May 11, 1960). 
103. Decree No. 69-815 of :-\ug. 28, 1969, [1969] J.O. 8927, [1969] D.S.L. 335. 
104. Id. art. I. This means, for instance, that a Belgian citizen, domiciled in the 
United States, is not entitled to the exemption and would have. to obtain a carte de 
commerfant like any extra-Community national. · · 
105. Decree No. 69-815 of Aug. 28, 1969, art. 2, [1969] J.O. 8927, [1969] D.S.L. 335. 
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These concepts arguably could have been ·written into the direct-
investment regulations in issue before the European Court of J us-
tice, and France could have attempted to deny Treaty benefits to 
a "post office box" corporation being used as a simple device for the 
creation of a French subsidiary of a third-country corporation and 
the transfer of capital from that corporation. Indeed, the Common 
Market Commission itself had, on another occasion, taken the posi-
tion that Treaty benefits should be granted only to corporations 
with a bona fide Community connection.106 The fact is, however, 
that France desired a much more effective screen than the Commis-
sion's position offered. The system of direct-investment regulations, 
as applied by France, preserved its freedom to reject investments not 
only from the foreign-controlled "post office box" corporation within 
the Community but also from any Community corporation under 
foreign control, even though, for example, the Belgian or German 
corporation in question might have extensive operations within its 
home country. For this reason, France was forced to defend its 
regulations on the broad-and weak-grounds that the treatment 
of corporations as citizens of Member States entitled to national 
treatment pursuant to the Treaty should not be extended to the 
right to invest and transfer capital. At the same time, France wished 
to be able to use its application procedure to obtain full information 
and disclosure, even regarding strictly intra-Community investment 
having no ties to third countries. 
Although the legal grounds of France's defense were weak, the 
wide scope of the political questions raised in fact became a strength. 
One sensed a certain hesitancy among Community officials to pro-
ceed to final judgment in a case in which the important issue of 
the status of Community corporations under foreign control would 
be adjudicated, and which might serve as a precedent limiting the 
Community's freedom to develop its own Community-wide policy 
toward third-country investment. With neither side very anxious 
to proceed to judgment, the scene was set for some sort of compro-
mise. After the case had been briefed and argued before the Euro-
pean Court of Justice, France enacted, on February 23, 1971, the 
modified direct-investment and exchange control regulations, ana-
lyzed above.107 It may be expected, therefore, that there will be no 
106. See Council Directive of Dec. 18, 1961, 5 E.E.C. J.O. 36 (1962) (General Program 
for Suppressing Restrictions of Free Establishment). 
107. See pt. II. C. 2. supra. 
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judicial resolution of the problems raised, and that, as a practical 
matter, the dispute has been settled.108 The net result is that France, 
while formally complying with the Commission's request, has main-
tained practically intact its power to compel all direct investments 
to be made the subject of an application for authorization, as well 
as those veto powers earlier possessed. The Commission, on the other 
hand, has gained a formal victory over a recalcitrant Member State 
and has maintained its freedom of action to develop a Community 
policy toward third-country investment. 
C. Investment from Outside the Common Market 
From the outset, the Community's outlook has been one of open-
ness to third-country investment (which as we shall see, means largely 
American investment), with this approach being challenged fre-
quently by France. The issue was first brought to light at the 
initial meeting of the European Parliamentary Assembly in 1958. 
In these proceedings, the French Prime Minister, Michel Debre, 
asked whether the Commission had taken a position on third-country 
-and particularly American-investment and suggested that a com-
mon Community policy should be taken toward any such investment 
that posed dangers to the Member States.109 In its reply, the Commis-
sion showed itself to be entirely favorable to third-country invest-
ment within the Community and discouraged the attempt to 
establish an exclusionary Community policy.110 It did state, how-
ever, that it was aware of specific problems that might result from 
overconcentration of foreign investment in certain industries and 
that it would hold itself ready to consult with Member States and 
to receive and disseminate information -about such investments.111 
In subsequent responses to Parliamentary questions, the Com-
mission took the position, in 1962, that there were no provisions in 
the EEC Treaty enabling the Commission to oppose third-country 
investment,112 and, in 1964, that the Commission would continue 
108. It is not certain that the EEC Court would always decline to decide such issues, 
despite the apparent settlement reached by the parties. Cf. Acciaierie e Tubificio di 
Brescia c. Hohe Behorde, No. 31/59 (Eur. Ct. J. June 26, 1959). 
109. I E.E.C. J.O. 25 (1958). 
110. Id. at 25-26. 
111. Id. at 25-26. 
II2. 5 E.E.C. J.O. 894 (1962). This early opinion seems to have been confirmed 
recently in the statement by the Commission, made in response to a Parliamentary 
question, that the purposed purchase by Litton Industries, a U.S. conglomerate, of a 
German typewriter manufacturer would not prima facie violate any EEC antitrust 
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to follow the situation carefully.113·While noting that statistics avail-
able from Member States had not been sufficient to permit the 
formation of solid conclusions, the Commission suggested that third-
country investment had aided Community growth.114 The Commis-
sion could be said to have made the tentative conclusion that 
Community enterprises would be able to react successfully to foreign 
investment without changing the framework of the EEC Treaty.1111 
Since 1965, however, the Commission's response to specific third-
country investment problems has in some cases been more reserved, 
although in no case has there been any effective action at the Com-
mission level to bar a particular foreign investment. In 1969 the 
Commission requested an independent study of the effect of Amer-
ican investment in the Common Market electronics industry. The 
report from the study generally opposed continued expansion of 
any American investment that threatened the existence or impeded 
the formation of European enterprises within the electronics in-
dustry.116 The report is still under study by the Commission. Also 
in 1969 the Commission, in response to a Parliamentary question, 
opposed the further expansion in Europe of Westinghouse by its 
proposed takeover of the Belgian company, Ateliers de Construction 
Electronique de Charleroi, as part of an over-all European expan-
sion move.117 Finally, with respect to the proposed 1970 takeover 
by the American company, International Telephone and Telegraph 
provisions, and that, in any event, alleged antitrust violations could be investigated 
only in accordance with tbe procedure set forth in Council Regulation No. 17 /62. See 
New Developments, 2 CCH CoMM. MKT. R.PT. ,i 9342 (1970) (reply to written question 
No. 344/69). 
113. 7 E.E.C. J.O. 3725 (1964). 
114. Id. at 3725-26. The Commission's conclusion that it has inadequate statistical 
information on which to base an opinion appears to continue. See 13 E.E.C. J.O. No. C 
13/5 (1970) (response of Jan. 21, 1970, to a Parliamentary question of Oct. 27, 1969), 
115. An over-all review of the Community's attitude toward third-country invest-
ment during the period 1958-1965 is found in W. BALEKJIAN, LEGAL ASPECTS OF FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1967), 
116. New Developments, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. ,r 9326 (1969) (summary of 170-
page report, The Electronic Industry of the Common Market and American Invest• 
ment.) 
117. Id., ,r 9327 (1969) (translation of Commission response, 12 E.E.C. J.O. No. C 
129/1 (1969)). The response stated in part: 
In the Westinghouse case, one may well ask whether reciprocal holdings by Euro• 
pean firms, which would also help to overcome the present isolation of the national 
markets and preserve genuine competition in these markets would not be prefer• 
able to a reorganization of the electrical industry under American leadership •••• 
Furthermore, the Commission belie,·es that a Community policy is needed and that 
the solution to the problem of striking a balance between Community and foreign 
capital lies in the very dynamism of European industry itself ••• , In the Com• 
mi~ion's view, there ts no. question of conflict between Member States and the 
institutions of the Community over the goals to be pursued in the matter of 
foreign investments. 
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Corporation (ITT), of General Biscuit (a European enterprise 
formed in 1965 by the pooling of assets of two German, five Belgian, 
four French, one Italian, and two Dutch companies), the Commis-
sion suggested, after observing that the takeover bid had not, after 
all, been successful, that General Biscuit had developed to the point 
that outside financing or technical help was no longer needed. Ac-
cordingly, it concluded: 
[T]he acquisition by ITT of an enterprise that was already an out-
growth of a merger of Community firms would have offered none of 
the advantages with regard to strengthening the European industrial 
structure which can sometimes be used to justify similar opera-
tions.118 
It thus appears that the Commission has begun to develop 
opinions regarding third-country investment not so much in terms 
of hostility to foreign investment as such but rather in relation to 
the impact of such investment on the "European industrial struc-
ture." This approach implies a theoretical basis of the ideal de-
velopment of industry within the Common Market. While no 
agreement has as yet been reached among the Member States on 
this subject, the Commission's thinking is revealed in its 1970 study, 
La Politique Industrielle de la Communaute.119 In this interesting 
document, the Commission finds that while it is absolutely necessary 
for industrial concentration to take place on a Community level, 
i.e., to create European enterprises, in £act the only significant con-
centrations by Europeans have been on the national level within 
single Member States. As the Commission found: 
The only international liaisons which are developing at a relatively 
rapid rhythm are those which unite community enterprises and those 
of third countries in general from the United States. They consist 
most often in the purchase or the taking over of control by a more 
powerful enterprise from a third country. While admitting the great 
interest which ties with firms from third countries may present, the 
Commission believes that the search for a better equilibrium in this 
domain must become an objective of the Community.120 
It has thus become the policy of the Commission to favor the for-
mation of "European enterprises"-whose capital and management 
will come from member countries and whose center of decision will 
lIS. New Developments, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP., 1J 9389 (1970) (Commission's 
answer to a written question). 
ll9. CoMMON MARKET COMMN., LA POLITIQUE !NDUSTIUELLE DE LA COMMUNAUTE 
(1970). 
120. Id. at 27. 
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be in Europe-of sufficient dimensions to meet the competitive chal-
lenge of "giant enterprises from the other side of the Atlantic."121 
Statistics furnished by the Commission in its study tend to prove 
the conclusion that third-country enterprises have made better use 
of the opportunities for concentration offered by the union of the 
six than have the enterprises of the Community countries themselves. 
From 1961 through 1969, third-country enterprises established over 
3,50Q new subsidiaries within the Community; during the same 
period Community enterprises created only 2,300 new subsidiaries 
in other Community countries.122 Third-country enterprises also 
were more active in taking over a controlling interest in existing 
corporations in member countries. The statistics show 820 such take-
overs (or mergers) during the period, compared with 257 takeovers 
of corporations in member countries by enterprises in other member 
countries during the same period.128 
The Commission, in its report, refers to the valuable contribu-
tion of foreign investment to growth and innovation and denies any 
thought of reacting to the problem by a policy of narrow protec-
tionism.124 The report goes on to state: 
The very rapid development of foreign investment in the com-
munity over the last ten years can, however, for certain sectors of 
the economy, pose difficult political and economic problems, as is 
witnessed by the attitude of member states at the time of one or 
another particular foreign investment operation. 
This problem is posed, above all, in sectors where, because of 
the present weakness of European industry, these purchases threaten 
to prevent, for a long period of time, the birth and development 
of European transnational industries. The consequences which result 
. . . show the complementary nature of a program of industrial 
structures and a policy adopted towards foreign takeovers. A Com-
121. Id. at 27. 
122. Id. at 92. 
123. Id. at 92. The complete statistics (based on a private firm's survey) are as 
follows for the period 1961-1966 (first six months only): Unilateral Establishment: 
From member country to member country 2300 
From third country to member country 3546 
From member country to third country 1158 
Cooperation-Minority Participations-Cross Interests-Joint Subsidiaries: 
:Between enterprises in same country 1352 
:Between enterprises in Common Market 1001 
:Between member country enterprises and third countries 2797 
Mergers and Takeovers of Control: 
Within same member countries 1861 
:Between different member countries 257 
From a member country to a third country 215 
From a third country to a member country 820 
124. Id. at 169. 
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munity policy towards industrial structures would be in facq very 
difficult to effect if common attitudes towards takeovers were not 
developed. 
In the view of the Commission, such a concert of purpose need 
not be reflected at all by a general restrictive policy in regards to 
purchases or takeovers by third country enterprises. But in cases 
where these takeovers go against objectives pursued by the govern-
ments-objectives which may be not only economic, but may also be 
tied to notions of national security-and which have motivated the 
public powers to make important financial and economic sacrifices, 
the Commission believes that a common policy must be found. In 
effect, it appears necessary that the member states henceforth pursue 
on a Community level the program which they have followed on a 
national level, now put into question by the narrowness of the na-
tional dimension. This drawing together would permit the adoption 
of a common position for the few sectors where the purchase of 
enterprises of significant dimensions imperils the legitimate objec-
tives pursued by member states or defined by the Community.125 
It remains to be seen whether the ideas developed in this docu-
ment will grow into a realistic program for the development of 
"European" enterprises and whether this in turn will lead to a for-
mal Community policy on third-country investment. Any such 
policy will necessarily draw much from the French legislation and 
policy with regard to foreign investment, for its controls are the 
most developed, and the Community can learn from their successes 
and failures. France wil continue to apply the greatest pressure 
for adoption of such a Community policy, for it is well aware that 
the effectiveness of its foreign investment policy will be severely 
limited as long as a foreign investment denied approval in France 
is welcome in the neighboring Common Market countries. 
IV. CURRENT TRENDS IN THE EXERCISE OF FRENCH CONTROLS 
A. The Dimension of the Foreign Investment Problem 
The problem of foreign investment in France, and the French 
reaction to it, can be best understood by first examining the amount 
of such investment, its growth, and the degree of foreign control 
of certain sectors of the French economy. Precise examination of 
these matters is made difficult by the fact that statistics on direct 
investment are to some extent inaccurate. Published French sta-
tistics, although kept in great detail, are reported on a balance-of-
payments basis, so that real increases in control, or in the growth 
of controlled capital assets, may be hidden by money transfers back 
125. Id. at 171-72. 
312 Michigan Law Review [Vol: 70:285 
to the controlling countries as dividends or long-term loans. Fur-
thermore, the French statistics frequently credit foreign investments 
to such transfer countries as Switzerland, Luxembourg, or sometimes 
Belgium without revealing the true identity of the investor. For this 
reason, most economists in France rely to a great degree on United 
States Department of Commerce statistics-which are based on a sur-
vey and reporting basis-to detail the amount of American invest-
ment in France; these figures, supplemented by French Ministry of 
Finance and Ministry of Industry statistics, give a reasonably com-
plete picture. 
American statistics indicate the following progression of United 
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These statistics are roughly confirmed by French Ministry of Finance 
figures for the same period, which likewise show that annual Amer-
ican investment grew only moderately from 1962 to 1967, with a 
sharp cutback in 1968.127 These Ministry of Finance statistics show 
that during this same period investment from oth~r EEC countries 
grew more rapidly, continuing without decrease even through 
1968.128 
The United States statistics on net capital outflow, while in-
cluding loans from United States parent companies to subsidiaries 
and investment in plant and equipment of the proceeds of foreign 
loans or other financing, still reflect money movements more than 
they reflect the permanent impact of American investment. The 
most important statistics from this latter point of view are the 
following figures, which reflect the growth of cumulative invest-
ment in France and the revaluation of controlled assets through 
currency revaluation and include retained earnings and royalties.120 
126. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS 29 (Oct. 1970), 24 (Oct. 
1968), 42 (Sept. 1967), 34 (Sept. 1966), 24 (Sept. 1965), IO (Aug. 1964), 18 (Aug. 1963), 22 
(Aug. 1962), 22 (Aug. 1961) [hereinafter SURVEY]. 
127. MINISTERE DE L'ECONOMIE ET DES FINANCES, EVOLUTION DES MOUVEMENTS l>E 
CAPITAUX Pruvts ENTRE LA FRANCE ET L'ETRANGER 1962-1968, at 3, 5 (1970). 
128. Id. at 3. 
129. SURVEY, supra note 126, at 28 (Oct. 1970), 24 (Oct, 1968), 42 (Sept. 1967), 34 
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Even these statistics, based on the value of controlled assets, do 
not tell the full story because the accounting principles involved 
tend to understate value.130 Moreover, in the case of a French 
corporation controlled by an American corporation, but with French 
minority shareholders, only the value of the percentage of shares 
actually owned by the American corporation is included in the 
above statistics. From the French point of view, the entire corporate 
value should be shown as under foreign control. 
The value of cumulative American direct investment in France 
has regularly been estimated to constitute between forty and fifty 
per cent of all foreign direct investment in France.131 Since, on the 
basis of income tax returns, the total net asset value of French 
enterprise is said to be approximately 56 billion dollars,132 foreign 
investment is seven per cent,133 and American investment is 3.5 per 
cent of that total value. 
These figures cannot in themselves be alarming to even the most 
fervent French proponents of protectionism. American investment 
in France is, in absolute figures, half of what it is in Germany and 
a third of what it is in the United Kingdom.134 Furthermore, in 
terms of American investment per capita, France has one of the low-
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Yet behind these figures lies the real fear of French advocates 
of control of foreign investment: the specter of the giant corporation 
130. The distortion is due to the use of historical costs to derive the figures. Such 
figures rarely represent the current value of the underlying asset or investment; the 
distortion gets worse over time with persistent inflation. 
131. MINISTERE DE L'lNDUSTRIE, RAPPORT SUR LES !NVESTISSEMENTS ETRANGERS DANS 
L'!NDUSTRIE FRAN9AISE 3 (1965) (Bock.anowski Report); Rivoire, lnvestissements lnter-
nationaux, Etrangers en France, Franfais a l'Etranger, L'EcoNOMIE 22 (No. 1.104, Feb. 
14, 1970). 
132. Rivoire, Le Dossier des Investissements Etrangers (No. 1, Jan. 19, 1970) (Mimeo-
graph, Credit Lyonnais). 
133. Id. at 2. 
134. See SURVEY, supra note 126, at 28 (Oct. 1970). 
135. See Les lnvestissements Americains dans la CCE, in DOCUMENTATION EUROPE• 
ENNE 1970 (Serie Syndicale Europeenne No. 9, Aug. 18, 1970). 
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under foreign control exercising disproportionate influence over 
certain sectors of the economy. If it be true that cumulative foreign 
investment represents only seven per cent of French commercial as-
sets, it is also true that very little of this investment is devoted to 
agriculture, transportation, public services, construction, the retail 
trade, and ship-building. Foreign investment is localized in industry, 
and here French corporatons under foreign control represent not 
seven per cent, but at least ten to fifteen per cent of asset value.180 
The theory that foreign investment tends to concentrate in large 
blocs with potential influence over key sectors of the economy seems 
to be confirmed by the observation that, of 110 French corporations 
reporting sales of more than 100 million dollars annually, 22 are 
foreign controlled.137 
American investment in France is certainly not limited to giant 
enterprises, however, and Department of Commerce statistics indi-
cate that there are 528 American companies doing business in France 
through branches, subsidiaries, or joint ventures.138 Of these, 160 
companies have more than 200 employees and 43 have more than 
1,000. Chrysler's subsidiary, SIMCA, with 21,000 employees, is the 
largest. 
The domination of certain key sectors of the economy by foreign 
interests has long been a fear of the government.130 According to 
the most recent unofficial estimates, foreign-controlled corporations 
now account for fifty per cent or more of French production in the 
following sectors: metals and machinery (zinc metallurgy, tractors, 
printing presses and equipment, office equipment, ball bearings, and 
razor blades); electrical equipment and electronics (heavy electrical 
motors, elevators, telephone equipment, computers and peripheral 
136. See Rivoire, supra note 132, at 2. (These figures are computed by including the 
entire value of the corporate assets when foreign interests have majority control of 
the corporation.) 
137. Id. The companies were identified as follows: 
American: Bull-General Electric, Esso Standard, General Motors France, I.B.M. 
France, Ideal Standard, International Harvester France, Kodak Pathe, L.M.T,· 
C.G.C.T., Mobil Oil Fran<;aise, SIMCA. 
Belgian: Jeumont-Schenider, Solvays, S.P.I.E.-Batignolles. 
Dutch: Phillips-Radiotechnique Group. 
Anglo-Dutch: Lever-Astra Group, Shell. 
British: BP, Dunlop. 
Swiss: Compagnie Electro-Mecanique, SOPAD. 
Italian: F.F.S.A. 
Canadian: Massey-Ferguson. 
138. AMERICAN FIRMS, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATES-FRANCE, U.S. DEPT, OF COM• 
MERCE, BUREAU OF INTL. COMMERCE (1970). 
139. For official, if now out-of-date, statistics on such sectors of the economy, see 
the summaries of the 1962 Ministry of Finance and 1963 Ministry of Industry reports 
in Torem &: Craig, supra note 1, at 674-75. 
December 1971] Foreign Investment in France 315 
equipment, semi-conductors, cathode tubes, recording tape, records, 
and electric razors); chemical products (abrasives, detergents, syn-
thetic rubber, carbon black, and photographic equipment); and food 
products (biscuits, margarine, concentrated milk, instant coffee, and 
powdered soup).140 
It is such examples of the penetration and control of specific 
industries, rather than the level of foreign investment itself, that 
provide the basis for government policy toward foreign investments. 
As the French government has pointed out, the continued expan-
sion of the French economy has resulted in annual foreign invest-
ment representing a progressively smaller percentage of annual 
productive investment in France.141 Therefore, one could expect 
the government's policy toward foreign investment to be highly 
selective. After some general reaction against American and other 
foreign investment in the earliest years of foreign penetration, 
French policy has evolved toward a generally favorable reaction to 
foreign investment with opposition reserved to selective cases of for-
eign control. 
B. The Background of Foreign Investment Policy 
and Latest Official Pronouncements 
The authors have earlier described the French government policy 
toward foreign investment prior to 1968.142 It can be summarized 
briefly as extremely receptive through mid-1964, at which time a 
definite chill set in through the actions of the then Minister of 
Finance, Valery Giscard d'Estaing, who was acting under the aegis 
of President de Gaulle. During the period 1964-1965, a number of 
investment applications were denied, and the government failed to 
act on a number of others for sufficiently long periods of time that 
some of the investors eventually went elsewhere. These policies re-
sulted in a substantial drop in foreign, and particularly American, 
investment, the effect of which was felt in 1966. However, no gen-
eralized set of investment criteria was established during this period. 
140. Rivoire, supra note 132, at 4. 
141. MINISTERE DE L'ECON0MIE ET DES FINANCES, supra note 127, at 3. The figures 








142. See Torem &: Craig, supra note I, at 701-03. 
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In January 1966, with the appointment of Michel Debre as Min-
ister of Finance, a period of relaxation set in, and the general policy 
reflected a presumption in favor of foreign-including American-
investment with the possible exception of cases in which sensitive 
national interests were involved.143 This has continued to be French 
policy, but events since 1968 have led not only to modification in 
the investment control regulations themselves, as described earlier,144 
but also to some rethinking of investment criteria. 
The general approach toward foreign investment-and, once 
again, it should be stressed that the principal problem is seen as 
being American investment-was spelled out in speeches given by 
President Pompidou and Prime Minister Chaban-Delmas in early 
1970. Prior to departing for an official visit to the United States, 
during which he was to visit with President Nixon, President 
Pompidou called a cabinet meeting (Conseil lnterministeriel) to 
consider the problem of foreign investment. The highlights of this 
meeting, as released to the press, were as follows: (1) foreign invest-
ments were to be considered favorably as long as French national 
interests were respected; (2) the formation of the Institut de Develop-
pement Industriel (a government organization designed to provide 
selected French enterprises with refinancing, recapitalization and, in 
some cases, merger with other French companies, in order to provide 
a French industrial solution in certain key areas and to serve as 
a positive counterbalance to foreign takeover bids) was announced; 
and (3) greater favor was to be shown to foreign investors who create 
a new company, and new productive capacity, rather than simply 
take over existing French companies.145 
President Pompidou developed his thoughts on the subject in 
a speech given at the Waldorf Astoria in New York on March 2, 
1970, in the following terms: 
Not only do we not refuse American investments, but we are 
disposed to favor them. Nothing, in my view, would be more preju-
dicial to French interests than to see American companies establish 
themselves only in the other countries of the Common Market. If 
Great Britain becomes a member of the Community, this position 
of principle would become even more marked, I will say even deter-
minative for the future of the Common Market. We will not accept 
being considered only as a "consumer market." This leads us to 
desire "production," that is the establishment of factories. 
143. Id. at 703. 
144. See pt. II. C. 2. supra. 
145. Le Monde, Feb. 21, 1970, at 22, col. 3. 
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This is what I have had the occasion to say, for example, to 
Henry Ford or David Rockefeller. 
But it is true that our industry is in full transformation, that it 
sometimes only finds with difficulty the necessary capital, and that its 
organization, frequently still family structured, raises obstacles to 
concentration. The state thus can not take a hands off attitude. It 
must aid and encourage concentration, and it must, during this 
period of change, protect. That is why we are entirely open to the 
implantation in France of American corporations, but we adopt a 
selective attitude towards the takeover of French enterprises by 
foreign groups of whatever nature. 
We wish to avoid having sectors of industry fall under foreign 
control under conditions which would, moreover, frequently violate 
your own anti-trust legislation. We seek to prevent this type of op-
eration from impeding earlier concentrations on the national level, 
and we insist that these takeovers, when they do take place be ac-
companied by a real enrichment of our economy, notably in the 
area of research, and the prospection of the entire European market. 
It is in this spirit that I was led, for example, to oppose the pur-
chase of Jeumont-Schneider by Westinghouse, but I would not be 
at all opposed to cooperation between the French group, which will, 
I hope, concentrate and rationalize this entire sector of our heavy 
electrical equipment industry, and a European or American group, 
whether it be Westinghouse or another.146 
These same points were further developed in a speech by Prime 
Minister Chaban-Delmas before the Franco-American Chamber of 
Commerce in New York on April 6, 1970. The Prime Minister em-
phasized that France would adopt a selective attitude toward Amer-
ican takeovers of French companies and would authorize those 
"which have positive advantages in terms of employment, research 
and development and exports, provided that they do not adversely 
affect the industrial reorganization going on in France."147 As proof 
of France's positive attitude toward American investment, the Prime 
Minister pointed to the opening in New York of the office of the 
French Industrial Development Agency created by DATAR.148 This 
new agency was created to inform Americans of possible investment 
146. Id., March 4, 1970, at 2, col. I. 
147. Id., April 17, 1970, at 20, col. I. 
148. The Delegation ti l'Amenagement du Territoire et ti l'Action Regionale [here-
inafter DATAR] is the agency charged with industrial area planning and regional 
development, whose principal purpose is to effect decentralization and to encourage 
investment in underdeveloped areas of France, all within the framework of the gov, 
ernment economic plan. With regard to both foreign and domestic investment, DATAR 
grants important investment incentives, including grants and taX reliefs, to investments 
complying with the established criteria. DATAR also has a voice on the Interministerial 
Council, which finally decides on the authorization of foreign investments, and may 
seek to oppose investment proposals not complying with its goals. 
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opportunities in France and of the possibility of obtaining French 
government subsidies or tax relief for investments that promote 
decentralization and aid to certain regions of France in accordance 
·with the government's economic plans. In addition, the Prime Min-
ister stated that new implantations (as opposed to takeovers) would 
generally be favored and that French corporations under foreign 
control would not suffer discriminatory treatment. 
C. Investment Criteria 
In determining what investments will be welcome in France, the 
Ministry of Finance and the Interministerial Council have applied 
broad and flexible criteria. Because of the nature of the political 
and economic factors involved in the determinations, these criteria 
cannot be anything but guidelines. They are informal and are not 
published. Nevertheless, certain issues appear to be regularly taken 
into consideration. 
I. Factors Favorable to the Granting of 
Investment Authorization 
a. Positive contribution to French balance of payments. Ordi-
narily, acquisitions or implantations by foreign companies in France 
will be accomplished by the transfer of substantial capital from 
abroad, which must be converted into French francs on the official 
exchange market, and will have a favorable effect on the balance 
of payments. This would not be the case, however, if the foreign 
investor were permitted to finance the investment by franc-borrow-
ing. Accordingly, it is virtually impossible to get government ap-
proval of a foreign takeover that is to be funded by franc-financing 
on the French market. Similarly, an investment will not be approved 
if the financial plans call for a small contribution of foreign capital 
followed by large borrowing in francs. The general rule is that at 
least fifty per cent of the foreign investment, whether takeover, 
implantation, or extension of an existing French subsidiary, be fi. 
nanced by transfer of foreign exchange from abroad. Finally, it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to obtain authorization for the purchase 
of stock in a French company in exchange for stock of the investing 
foreign company since such stock-for-stock deals are not helpful to 
the balance of payments. 
In addition to the requirement of a one-to-one ratio between 
foreign financing and French financing of direct investments, there 
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is a further government preference that a company under foreign 
control maintain a reasonable "equilibrium" between equity and 
debt. While there is no fixed capital-to-debt ratio, the Ministry will 
not approve a direct investment application that calls for "thin in-
corporation" and a very high debt structure. This preference applies, 
in principle, even when the debt is incurred from a foreign source, 
for while recourse to foreign borrowing is favored over franc-financ-
ing, the government also prefers that the foreign-exchange contribu-
tion come in the form of sunken capital. Thus, substantial foreign or 
domestic borrowing is a negative factor. The existence of a very large 
foreign debt may serve as a force toward future currency speculation, 
and large domestic debt is a strain on the French financial market. 
Moreover, the government's interest in requiring the maintenance 
of a reasonable equity-to-debt ratio continues after the investment 
has been effected, and if the annual reports filed with the Ministry 
show a substantial imbalance in favor of borrowings, the Ministry 
may request the capitalization of loans or undistributed earnings. 
These requirements of a positive contribution to the French 
balance of payments have been imposed to a lesser or greater degree 
since the reimposition of foreign investment controls in I 967. An 
unannounced suspension of these criteria by the Ministry of Finance, 
commencing in November 1971, was occasioned by the pressures for 
revaluation of the franc, following upon defensive monetary mea-
sures taken by the United States.149 It became a part of the French 
international monetary position to discourage the accumulation of 
dollars (and other foreign currencies) in its central banks. Instead 
of requiring an input of foreign exchange as a condition of permit-
ting foreign investment, the Ministry, in an heretical about-face, has 
required resort to those devices-stock swaps, local franc borrowings 
for investment, deferred contribution to capital increases-which 
had so recently been forbidden. 
For the moment, the French strategy is to defer by all reasonable 
devices any import of dollars so that the franc maintains a low pro-
file vis-a-vis the dollar and therefore as a less rich country the re-
valuation of the franc will be smaller than might be required of the 
richer dollar possessors such as Japan and Germany. These new cri-
teria, which constitute a dramatic departure from past French policy, 
will probably only be applied as a short-term measure during a 
period of monetary instability. In the long run it will continue to 
149. See pt. II. E. supra. 
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be to France's advantage to seek, in most cases, to require a positive 
contribution to its balance of payments as a price of foreign invest-
ment authorization. 
b. Establishment of a new company as opposed to a takeover. 
The idea of encouraging foreign interests to create new companies 
rather than to take control of an existing French company is appeal-
ing. The establishment of a new enterprise often results in the 
infusion of new productive capital and new plant and equipment. 
On the other hand, in a takeover, frequently the purchase price 
paid to the owners (often a controlling family) is used in passive in-
vestment instead of being reinvested in new industrial projects. In 
practice, the takeover has been difficult to discourage and the govern-
ment has realized that denying authorization for a foreign takeover 
of a failing corporation will not necessarily preserve that company 
for the economy, particularly if a new and dynamic competitive for-
eign implantation is permitted. Nevertheless, when there is a choice 
between competing foreign investments, the one that proposes es-
tablishment of a new company and new industrial plant will ordi-
narily be preferred. 
c. Technical contribution to the French economy. The French 
government realizes that in certain industries-particularly those 
based on the newest scientific developments-foreign industry may 
be in advance of French industry and that in some cases foreign in-
vestment is the only practical way of bringing these developments 
rapidly to France. As a price for permitting such investment, how-
ever, the government is anxious to assure that the technical devel-
opments and the ongoing improvements benefit the French economy. 
What it wishes to guard against is the takeover of an existing com-
mercial network in order to sell items that will be imported in whole 
or in part from abroad, thus leading to the exploitation of France as 
a mere consumer market. By the same token, the government would 
disfavor the installation in France of already depreciated industrial 
equipment that will soon be outmoded by newer developments 
taking place abroad. In order to advance French interests, the govern-
ment may frequently require, as the price of authorizing an industrial 
implantation, that the company make a commitment to install a 
research facility in France. It is hoped that by this device new de-
velopments will originate in France and that French personnel will 
be in the avant-garde of technological and industrial developments 
rather than simply in the position of applying techniques developed 
abroad. 
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d. Competition in a sector of the economy suffering from lack 
of competition. The French economy is in many sectors characterized 
by small units, frequently family structured, which may require some 
protection during the present period of reorganization and concentra-
tion.150 At the same time, there are a few areas of industry, frequently 
those requiring a very large capital investment, in which the rela-
tively small size of the French market has led to virtual single-
company monopolies. When these conditions exist, the French 
government will favor the entry of competition even if foreign com-
panies are the only effective possibility. An example of the applica-
tion of this policy was the authorization given to Alcoa to establish 
an aluminum extrusion facility in France at Chateauroux in l'In-
dre.151 Alcoa constituted welcome competition for Pechiney, a giant 
company that engaged in all facets of the aluminum industry through-
out the world and controlled about ninety per cent of the French 
aluminum industry. 
e. Aiding France's over-all economic plan and decentralization 
policy. A study of the French attitude toward foreign investment 
cannot be understood without considering the French government's 
role in directing economic growth in general• and decentralization 
from the Paris region iri particular. ·Economic goals for the French 
economy are established in an over-all five year plan (Le Plan) that 
the government seeks to implement, on the one hand, by its control 
of public expenditures and the management of the large sectors of 
the economy dominated by government-owned corporations (the 
aviation industry, insurance companies, some banks, and some auto-
mobile companies) and, on the other hand, by offering incentives 
or imposing penalties for certain activities of privately o,vned c-0n-
cerns. The decentralization program is a specific instance of this 
guidance: substantial subsidies_and tax-saving programs are available 
for new industrial implantation in depressed areas. Foreign com-
panies seeking to invest in France are entitled to obtain such sub-
sidies on the same footing as local companies. Investment applications 
will tend to be favored if they will result in creating new jobs in 
zones designated by the government; by the same token; insistence· 
on implantation in an area considered to be overcrowded-notably 
the Paris region-may result in a refusal. 
£. French participation in the corporate decision-making pro-
cess. One of the greatest fears_ en~endered by foreign investment is 
150, See te.xt accompanying note 146 supra. 
:15L. R. DICKIE,. FOREIGN.~: FRANCE .86 .(1970). 
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that important management decisions about investment, develop-
ment, and operations will be made not in France but abroad at the 
headquarters of a parent company, where French interests will not 
be sufficiently considered. Even though management of the local sub-
sidiary may be confided largely to French personnel this local influ-
ence is not a full solution to the problem, because key decisions will 
necessarily be made by those who have the ultimate control of the 
subsidiary. Put another way, the problem of the so-called multi-
national company is that the power of control is exercised neither by 
the nationals of the country where a subsidiary is established nor by 
a mixed group of nationals from a number of countries where opera-
tions are conducted. Rather, the control is exercised exclusively by 
the key members of the management and board of directors of the 
foreign parent company, who have the nationality of the country 
where the parent company is located. Thus, key decisions affecting 
French subsidiaries are very frequently made in the United States 
by Americans, who may be more concerned about what is good for 
the entire multinational group than what is good for the French 
subsidiary. Not all decisions favor the American parent, but they may 
favor one country over another instead of letting each foreign affili• 
ate do what is best for itself. Hence, unfairness to local interests can, 
and sometimes does, result. A few multinational companies-particu-
larly those in highly developed technological industries-are respond-
ing to this psychological problem by naming foreign personnel to key 
positions in the parent company itself. Thus, the president of IBM 
World Trade Corporation is a Frenchman, Jacques Maisonrouge, 
and there are a number of other foreigners on the board of directors. 
Another company in the computer industry, Control Data Corpora-
tion, has named as its vice-president in charge of international 
operations a Frenchman, Gerard Beaugonin. Other examples abound. 
These experiments are still in their infancy, but a multinational 
company whose organization has been designed to permit manage-
ment personnel from foreign subsidiaries to succeed to decision-
making posts in the parent company will be looked on with favor 
when it seeks to establish itself in France. 
2. Factors Unfavorable to the Granting of Investment Authorization 
Obviously, the principal factor weighing against investment ap-
proval is the failure to meet the positive criteria described above. 
But the following special situations, which may lead to refusal of 
authorization, also merit consideration. 
a. Domination of a sector of the economy. As pointed out earlier, 
December 1971] Foreign Investment in France 323 
there are a number of sectors of the French economy in which 
foreign-controlled subsidiaries already account for more than fifty 
per cent of the sector's production.152 That an entire area of the 
French economy might fall under foreign control is a pervading fear 
in certain government circles. The reaction is to preserve the French 
elements in the area by refusing authorization for a takeover or for 
the installation of a new enterprise if either would result in a 
foreign firm dominating the activity. It is also true that domination 
most frequently arises in an area where the foreign company's tech-
nological advances permit it to attain a position of control that 
mere size and economic strength alone could not have attained. An 
example would be the semi-conductor industry in France, which is 
dominated by American subsidiaries. In this area, the government 
had a difficult decision to make, because a refusal to permit foreign 
investment might have prevented the French economy as a whole 
from profiting by the new developments. 
b. Interference with an officially sponsored ''privileged field." 
The government response to the threat of foreign domination has 
been to sponsor, in certain key areas, a "French" solution. This has 
been accomplished by applying incentives to induce mergers result-
ing in local entities of dimensions sufficient to meet foreign competi-
tion. These companies may then be favored in the awarding of 
contracts by the government and its nationalized corporations. In 
the computer "software" field, for example, the Plan Calcul was 
designed to secure a French solution for at least part of the computer 
industry. (The computer "hardware" sector was already substantially 
dominated by the foreign-controlled companies, IBM and Bull-Gen-
eral Electric/Honeywell.) If a proposed new foreign investment 
would jeopardize such a government-sponsored program, it might 
well be refused. It should be emphasized that the areas in which such 
government concerns exist are very few indeed. 
c. Excessive "border area" investments. There is at least one 
field in which official concern is directed at something other than 
American investment. The problem exists in the areas of France 
bordering on Germany-particularly Alsace-where German capital 
has been invested extensively and at an ever-increasing rate, both in 
takeovers of companies and in the establishment of new companies. 
It has been estimated that from 1955 to 1968, thirty per cent of the 
30,000 new jobs created in the area have been the result of German 
investment.153 While government concern about this growing foreign 
152. See text accompanying pote 140 supra. 
153. Les Echos, April 14, 1969, at 4, col. 3. 
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influence is real, opposition would be difficult politically because it 
would necessitate moving against another member of the Common 
Market, and also because economically the Alsace area desperately 
needs new investment to replace the dying coal and steel industries. 
Hence, the latest official position is that no government action will 
be taken against such foreign investment, but that a special effort 
now should be made to encourage new and counterbalancing na-
tional investment.154 It is not certain, however, that an attempted 
investment in a particularly sensitive border area might not meet 
renewed government opposition today. 
It should be made clear that, although these criteria are considered 
by the government in its decision-making process, they do not con-
stitute hard-and-fast rules. As the authors orginally emphasized in 
1968, there never have been published any official guidelines for 
foreign investment.155 This is still true. The administration contin-
ues to reserve the right to weigh each application separately, and 
deliberately rejects the formulation of a detailed investment code in 
the interest of preserving its ad hoc administrative discretion. It is 
therefore more meaningful to consider some of the cases in which the 
veto power has been exercised, with recognition of the fact that only 
a handful of cases a year meet with rejection and that hundreds of 
foreign investments are eventually authorized. 
D. Some Examples of Investment Refusals 
I. Bull-Bull-General Electric-Honeywell-Bull 
No example demonstrates both the concern of the French govern-
ment toward foreign investment and the practical limits on the power 
of government intervention better than the complicated history of 
Compagnie des ·Machines Bull, the leading French computer com-
pany. The story, which has been described in some detail elsewhere,160 
can be divided into three acts. 
First, in Februray 1964, the French government opposed General 
Electric's (GE) bid to take a minority participation in Bull. Bull, 
the largest strictly French computer company, had impressive tech-
nical qualifications and was commercially well established with an 
154. Id. (remarks of Couve de Murville, then Prime Minister). 
155. See Torem &: Craig, supra note 1, at 702. 
156. The most complete version of the first episodes in the Bull saga, including 
reproduction of the pertinent official -government and corporate documents, is found 
in VEILLARD, L'AFFAIRE BUI.I. (S.P.A.G., Paris, 1968). See also R. DICKIE, FOREIGN INVEST• 
MENT: FRANCE 68-71 (1970). . 
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excellent sales and service network covering Western Europe·. How-
ever, by 1962 it found itself technically outdistanced in several fields 
by IBM's French subsidiary. Because of its relatively small size in 
comparison with the multinational computer giants, its :finances were 
strained to the breaking point by the effort to maintain a competitive 
budget for ongoing research and development and by the special 
financial burdens arising from the necessity of marketing computers 
by means of a self-financed leasing program. In these circumstances, 
discussions were entered into with GE to make arrangements for 
that company to take a twenty per cent participation in Bull. Al-
though the final financial terms were not agreed upon, discussions· 
were based upon a proposal calling for the issuance of 700,000 new_ 
shares at forty dollars per share, which would have constituted a 
contribution to capital of 28 million dollars.151 In addition, GE 
promised technical assistance to Bull and development of Bull's own 
research facilities. On February 4, 1964, following lengthy consulta-
tions between Bull and the French government, but prior to final 
agreement between the parties themselves on the precise terms to 
submit to the government, the Minister of Finance advised Bull that 
the government would oppose this foreign investment.158 The govern-
ment favored a "French" solution and attempted to impose one by 
withholding government credits and orders from Bull until it was 
agreed that a new French group would be permitted to take over 
effective control of Bull. The new group was to be comprised of two 
technical companies, C.S.F. (Compagnie Generale Telegraphie Sans 
Fil) and C.G.E. (Compagnie Generale d'Electricite), a=id two finan-
cial groups, Banque de Paris et des Pays Bas and a consortium of 
French government controlled banks. The new group obtained 
a twenty per cent participation- in Bull for 7 million dollars as the 
result of the purchase of 700,000 new shares at ten dollars per share. 
Further increases in capital and further long-term bank financing 
were acknowledged to be necessary and were envisioned. A remark-
able part of the arrangement, sponsored by the Ministry of Finance, 
was that the new holders of twenty per cent of the equity were to 
obtain control of two thirds of the board of directors.159 But while 
this "fire-brigade" solution secured some interim bank financing for 
Bull, which was then on the verge of bankruptcy, and responded to 
some of the concerns of the French government about the manage-
157. VEILLARD, supra note 156, at 34, 40-41. 
-158. Id. at 62. -•--.. --- ~-- --- ~ ---- M ------- --- ... 
159. Id. at 145. 
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ment structure of Bull, it did not solve any of the long-range tech-
nological and commercial problems of the company. 
It was in these circumstances that new discussions (which may be 
termed the second act) were undertaken with GE in the interest of 
responding to the needs of Bull while meeting the objections of the 
Ministry of Finance. The result was the splitting up of the operating 
portions of Bull into two parts: Societe Industrielle Bull-General 
Electric (S.I.B.G.E.), the research and production unit, in which Bull 
retained fifty-one per cent of the shares and GE obtained forty-nine 
per cent; and Compagnie Bull General Electric (B.G.E.), the sales and 
service organization, which would be controlled by GE with fifty-one 
per cent of the shares. GE's payment for these shares amounted to 
210 million francs, or approximately 42 million dollars. This partici-
pation was equal to a purchase price for Bull shares of approximately 
fifteen dollars per share. The new arrangement was vastly different 
and far less desirable to Bull than the original proposal of approxi-
mately forty dollars per share for the twenty per cent interest. The 
new structure became effective in November 1964, after receiving 
the formal agreement of the Minister of Finance.160 GE, with govern-
ment approval, subsequently increased its holdings in these two 
companies to sixty-six per cent of the shares, because the French 
interests failed to respond to subsequent calls for increased capital. 
If the second act of the Bull drama demonstrated the limitations 
on the government's ability to utilize its control powers to impose 
a solution contrary to the commercial forces at play, the third act 
demonstrated just how volatile those forces could be. After years of 
struggle to gain a lasting foothold in the computer market, General 
Electric in 1970 entered into an agreement with its American com-
petitor, Honeywell, to transfer its computer operations throughout 
the world to a new company that would be dominated by Honeywell. 
This transfer of control of the Bull subsidiaries from one American 
company to another required French government authorization. 
After receiving adequate assurances from Honeywell that the level 
of local employment would be maintained and that research would 
continue to be conducted in France, the government granted its 
authorization and Bull-General Electric became Honeywell-Bull.161 
2. Westinghouse-] eumont-Schneider 
If the "Affaire Bull" demonstrated French concern for the key 
computer sector of the economy, the· "Affaire Westinghouse" was 
160. Id. at 178. 
161. International Herald Tribune, July 30, 1970, at 7, col. !!. 
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motivated by a similar concern for the heavy electrical equipment 
sector.162 The leading French company in this area is Jeumont-
Schneider, an affiliate of the famous Schneider complex. Interestingly 
enough, this company had been partially under foreign control since 
1966 when the young Belgian financier and heir to an industrial 
empire, Baron Empain, took a twenty-five per cent interest in the 
parent, Schneider S.A., and a sixty-five per cent interest in J eumont-
Schneider itself. In 1968 Westinghouse opened negotiations with 
the Baron to acquire both his Belgian electricai equipment company, 
Ateliers de Construction de Charleroi (partially controlled by the 
Empain Group), and Jeumont-Schneider. The intent of Westing-
house was to create a multinational "European" heavy electrical 
equipment consortium through the acquisition of its French, Belgian, 
Spanish, and Italian licensees. 
The first request for authorization for the takeover was made in 
October 1968; the reaction of the de Gaulle government at that 
time was to withhold authorization pending realization of a hoped-for 
French solution to the problem. With the change of government 
following the resignation of President de Gaulle in April 1969, a 
second attempt to obtain authorization was made. Assurances were 
expressly given that a research facility would be created in France to. 
ensure French and European participation in the future develop-
ment of this key industry. On December 5, Xavier Ortoli, Minister 
of Scientific and Industrial Development, told the Westinghouse 
executives that the government considered maintenance of the heavy 
electrical industry in French hands as "a national imperative."163 
Consequently, authorization was denied. The French solution 
created to offset the proposed Westinghouse takeover was a concen-
tration between the French companies of Alsthom and C.G.E. (Com-
pagnie Generale d'Electricite).164 What further international alliances 
this new French group will be required to enter in order to attain 
the size and stature necessary for further development in this key 
industry is not yet certain; nor is it certain what larger group 
Jeumont-Schneider will eventually join, the Westinghouse arrange-
ment having failed. In the meantime, Westinghouse goes forward 
with its European plan, excluding, for the moment, France. 
162. The Westinghouse-Jeumont-Schneider case was widely reported in the French 
and international press. For some of the background, see Bonnot, Energie: L'Atome 
aux Mains des Industrielles, L'Express (Paris) Dec. 1-7, 1969, at 90, 91, col. l; Enter-
prise, Dec. 20, 1969, at 53, col. 1. 
163. France Blocks Westinghouse Combine, International Herald Tribune, Dec. 6, 
1969, at 1, col. 5. · · ' 
164. Le Figaro, Dec. 7, 1969. 
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In early -1969, the American company, Leasco, negotiated with 
the French company, SEMA, to obtain a minority interest in SEMA 
and further expand its computer software and computer leasing 
programs in Europe.165 The SEMA group consisted of a French 
parent company, SEMA (Metra International), having both French 
and foreign (German, Belgian, Spanish, British, and Italian) sub-
sidiaries, and having approximately 2,000 employees. Leasco, which 
had gotten its start in computer leasing in 1961 and had rapidly 
expanded into "s,oftware" activities, employed approximately 8,500. 
Its shares, first opened to public trading in 1965, had enjoyed a 
spectacular increase in value through 1969. On February 5, 1969, the 
presidents of the two companies announced that Leasco, in return for 
a contribution of 60 million francs, would take a twenty per cent 
interest in the capital of SEMA and that the entry of other European 
companies into the group was possible. It was intended, however, 
that the majority interest would remain in French hands.100 
The acquisition, which involved both the taking of a substantial 
equity interest and a program for cooperation with the American 
company, required the authorization of the Minister of Finance,107 
and an appropriate investment declaration was made. As time passed, 
the parties began to suspect that the deal could not obtain the 
:requisite approval. Finally, on April 20, Leasco, realizing that its bid 
'ivas in fact being rejected by the process of delaying tactics, withdrew 
its offer.168 
The government's refusal of an American minority acquisition in 
the computer software field demonstrated its strong intent to pre-
empt for local interests the software field, in which the smaller capi-
tal expenses involved do not require the intervention of a huge 
multinational company ·as do the greater capital outlays in the com-
puter hardware field. It was reasoned that the taking of a minority 
interest by a much larger foreign company would lead eventually to 
an increase in this participation and eventual foreign domination. 
This is the same thinking that was manifested in the government's 
"Act I'' intervention to prevent General Electric from taking a 
twenty per cent interest in Bull. 
This policy of protectionism toward the fledgling French com-
165~ Le Monde, Feb. 5, 1969, at 26, col. 5. 
166. Id. (announcement by the management of SEMA). 
167. S~e. text.accompanying. notes 9-13_ supra..._ 
168. Le Monde, April 20-21; 1969, at 28, col. I. ·· · 
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puter software industry had· earlier been applied to prevent another 
American company (Auerback Corporation) from obtaining a forty 
per cent interest in the French software firm, CEGOS.169 The policy 
has not, however, been applied blindly. At the end of 1969, the 
Minister of Finance authorized the creation of a joint venture be-
tween CEGOS (fifty-one per cent), the Credit Lyonnais (twenty-nine 
per cent), and the California company, Tymshare (twenty per cent), 
for the creation of a new telephonic computer time-sharing operation 
based on the American company's developments and experience.170 
This venture did not create the problem of a takeover of a French 
activity since it involved the creation of new technical activity 
through the coordination of the assets of the partners. · 
4. ITT-· Pompes Guinard 
ITT, today America's ~ighth largest industrial enterprise,171 
owes its rapid growth over the last ten years to ?- policy of diversifica-
tion that has changed it from an· electrical and communications 
manufacturer to a high-flying conglomerate.172 One of its diverse 
activities includes the manufacture of pumps, and it is represented 
on the .French market in this activity by its control of Pompes_ 
Salmson, a French company acquired in 1962. 
In 1968, ITT sought control of a second French company in this 
sector, Pompes Guinard. Combined with its existing activities, this 
acquisition would have given ITT forty per cent of the French 
market. Conscious of the sensitivity of the government to foreign 
domination of an industrial sector, ITT stressed in its application 
that the center of the French company's decision-making would 
remain in France, that the management would remain French, that 
it would pursue locally industrial research, and that it would develop 
export markets and create new jobs.173 It also emphasized that the 
purchase would be favorable to France's balance of payments, not 
only because increased exports would be possible through ITT's 
distribution network, but aJso because the Guinard factory in Cha-
teauroux could be used to s~pply electric motors to Salmson, which 
until then had purchased two thirds of its requirements from 
abroad.174 
169. Id. at col. 2. 
170. Les Echos, Dec. 5, 1969, at 7, col. I. 
171. The Fortune Directory of the 500 Largest Industrial Corporations, FORTUNE, 
May 1971. 
172. See I.T.T.-A Study in Diversity, FINANCIAL WORLD, Dec. IO, 1969, at 5. 
173. See International Herald Tribune, Feb. 6, 1970, at 7, col. 2. 
174. Les Echos, Oct. 22, 1969, at 2, col. 4. 
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Despite ITT's attempts to assuage French fears, Ministry of Fi-
nance authorization was postponed temporarily in February 1970. 
ITT spokesmen declared that the company would protest this re• 
fusal of investment authorization to the Nixon Administration and 
to the State Department.175 The protest, if in fact officially made, was 
not effective and the ajournement of direct investment authorization 
became definitive in June.176 
5. Fiat-Citroen 
French authorities have remained traumatized from the effects 
of the aquisition in 1963 of the major French automobile manu• 
facturer, SIMCA, by Chrysler.177 This takeover was effected by the 
purchase of publicly held shares on the French Bourse by Swiss 
intermediaries, and was not subject to government veto pursuant to 
th.en prevailing exchange control regulations.178 Since that time the 
administration has watched closely over the industry, and it is safe 
to say that any further attempted American penetration by way of 
a takeover in the basic production area would meet vigorous opposi• 
tion. At the same time, the other elements of the French national 
automobile industry, including the state-owned company, Renault, 
and more particularly the independents, Citroen and Peugeot, have 
sought to expand their vistas to a European or multinational basis, 
Citroen, representing twenty-five per cent of French production, 
was the most active in seeking an alliance, in part because of its 
need for outside financing and in part because of its need for com• 
mercial outlets for marketing of exports, a field in which it had 
traditionally lagged behind Renault and Peugeot.17° The search for 
such an arrangement was facilitated by the fact that control of Citroen 
rested largely in the hands of the Michelin family, who also con-
trolled France's largest tire manufacturer.180 This situation attracted 
the interest of the giant Italian automobile manufacturer, Fiat. In 
September of 1968, Fiat and Citroen jointly announced that an 
175. International Herald Tribune, Feb. 6, 1970, at 7, col. 2. 
176. Les Echos, June 19, 1970, at 1, col. 2. 
177. For a further discussion of details of the takeover, see R. DICKIE, supra note 
156, at 71. 
178. Present investment controls provide that purchase on the stock exchange of 
shares is exempt from direct-control procedures only if the purchaser acquires less 
than 20% of the corporation's outstanding stock in this manner, Decree No. 67-78 of 
Jan. 27, 1967, art. 2(3)(b), [1967] J.O. 1073, [1967) D.S.L. 81. 
179. See Thelier, Le Gouvernement va se prononcer sur l'opportunitt! d'un accord 
entre Citroen et Fiat, Le Monde, Sept. 27, 1968, at 1, col. 5, and at 22, col. 3. 
180. Le Monde, Oct. 1, 1968, at 24, col. 1. 
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accord in principle had been reached, pursuant to which Fiat would 
take approximately a thirty per cent interest in Citroen (by the 
formation of a holding company-to be owned fifty-one per cent by 
Michelin and forty-nine per cent by Fiat-to acquire Michelin's 
interest in Citroen), and that a series of joint marketing arrangements 
would be entered into.181 The agreement was subject to the obtain-
ing of any required government authorizations. 
On October 12, 1968, the office of the Prime Minister announced 
that the government would not permit the investment, although no 
objection was voiced to the principle of technical and commercial 
cooperation. The government's reason was said to be the desire to 
maintain the "independence of an important French industrial 
corporation" and to ensure the continued equilibrium of the French 
automobile industry and the employment situation therein.182 
The denial of this intra-Common Market investment surely 
violated the provisions of the EEC Treaty.183 Nevertheless, the parties 
were not anxious to raise the legal question,184 and instead continued 
to work toward an agreement acceptable to the government. On 
October 28, 1968, the two firms announced a new agreement pur-
suant to which the Italian group would acquire only fifteen per cent 
of the capital of Citroen. This time the French government voiced 
no objection.185 
Finally, two years later, in July 1970, Fiat renewed its bid to take 
a larger interest in the capital and management of Citroen, by the 
same method of taking a forty-nine per cent share in a company hav-
ing :fifty-three per cent of the shares of Citroen. In a different climate 
of political opinion, the French government offered no opposition, 
and Citroen became part of a multinational enterprise.186 
6. Perfumes: Helena Rubenstein-Parfums Rochas 
By 1970, a substantial part of the French perfume industry was 
already under foreign control.187 The French government had im-
181. Le Monde, Sept. 29-30, 1968, at 1, col. 5. 
182. Le Monde, Oct. 12, 1968, at 21, col. 2. 
183. EEC Treaty art. 67. 
184. A question was raised by a legislator in the European Parliament regarding 
the Treaty violation, but the Commission's answer, while clearly setting forth the 
applicable freedom of investment principles, stated that it had no information per-
mitting it to conclude that an investment application had been denied by the opera-
tion of a forbidden national investment regulation. This was the result of the French 
government's making its objection on a political level and presumably not by a written 
investment refusal. See 12 E.E.C. J.O. No. C 6/3 (1969). 
185. Le Monde, Oct. 29, 1968, at 25, col. I. 
186. Le Monde, July 30, 1970, at 10, col. I. 
. 187. It has been said that only four of the fifteen major French perfume com-
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posed no veto upon the acquisitions of Belmain and Raphael by 
Revlon, of Coty by Pfizer, of Caron by A.H. Robbins, of Molyneux 
by Union International Company, of Forvil by Bristol Myers, of 
Lucien Lelong by Nestle Lemur, of Lentheric by Beecham, and of 
Corday by Max Factor.188 
Parfums Rochas was a likely candidate for a foreign takeover. It 
ranked sixth among French perfume manufacturers and, while having 
a very substantial turnover, had little penetration of the important 
United States export market.189 In these circumstances, an American 
buyer with knowledge of the American market should have been 
able to give the company its greatest chance for an increase in export 
sales. At the same time, there were important internal reasons for 
selling to outside interests. While a substantial interest in the com-
pany was owned by the widow of the founder of the company, who 
also managed the company, there were important minority interests 
held by active managers within the company. Litigation had de-
veloped between the two factions and a receiver had been appointed 
to manage the business because of the conflict. The Rochas family felt 
that a sale to a third party would be a solution to the litigation. 
The American company, Helena Rubenstein, Inc., which already 
had substantial interests in the beauty products field in France, 
made an offer to purchase eighty per cent of the company for 24 
million dollars,190 a figure representing a price/ earnings ratio of about 
twenty-to-one. On June 10, 1970, the Ministry rejected this "Ameri-
can solution" to the problem.191 The grounds were apparently that 
although many promises had been made in the past by American 
purchasers of cosmetic and perfume companies, in fact export targets 
propounded to induce France to authorize the takeovers had seldom 
been realized. As no technology was involved in this proposed take-
over, there was no special reason for the government to acquiesce in 
the American bid. Instead, a local solution was favored. The leading 
French pharmaceutical house, Laboratoires Roussel-Uclaf, concluded 
- - -
panies remain under strictly French control. See R. DICKIE, supra note 156, at 76. A 
distinction should be made, however, between the beauty products and toilet products 
sector of the industry on the one hand, in which approximately 50% of the industry 
.is under foreign control, and the alcohol-based perfume sector (scent making) on the 
other hand, in which foreign penetration is only 17%, Les Echos, June 10, 1970, at 
4, col. 4. 
188. ie Figaro, June 10, 1970, at 16, col. 7. 
189. Id. 
190. Les Echos, June 10, 1970, at 16, col. 7. 
191. Le Figaro, June 10, 1970, at 16, col. 7. 
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a takeover arrangement in O~tober 1_970.!92 Oddly enough, a -con-
tr911ing interest in Roussel-Uclaf is held l;>y a <;erman chemical con-
cern. If a strictly French solution was not produced for Rochas, at 
least a European solution was found. 
7. Food Products: Grey Poupon and Orangina 
It should not be thought that Ministry of Finance disapproval has 
been reserved solely for foreign investments in key sectors of the 
economy, such as automobiles, or in highly developed technical areas, 
such as computers. Recently two foreign investments in the food 
products field have been vetoed. _ 
On December 8, 1970, the Finance Ministry rejected the H. J. 
Heinz proposal to acquire a controlling interest in Grey Poupon, an 
important local Dijon mustard manufacturer with a gross turnover 
of about 10 million dollars per year.193 The acquisition of this spe-
.cialized, one-product company would have given Heinz a toe-hold 
in France. 
Both companies were well kno1vn and therefore a capital move-
ment among such prominent parties excited special administrative 
scrutiny, not of the financial terms and royalties, but of the export 
potential afforded by Heinz as purchaser balanced against the loss 
to the French patrimony of a strong, albeit small, piece of its econ-
omy. The economic reason for the refusal was that Heinz, which 
was not essentially in need of a local mustard source, really wanted a 
strong French distributing organization to market its products pro-
duced abroad. Poupon, therefore, would have given a strong dis-
tribution network to Heinz and would have made it possible for 
Heinz to flood France with foreign food imports, thus injuring the 
struggling and fractionized French food industry. This detrimental 
effect would have been unaccompanied by any real advance in tech-
nology and would have been balanced by only a dubious increase in 
exports. In this situation, the administration concluded France would 
be better served by a purchase by a French concern or, failing that, 
by a Common Market group. Accordingly, it was announced on 
January 2, 1971, that the French company, Chocolats Poulain, would 
take over Grey Poupon at the same price that the American com-
pany would have paid.194 
A similar veto was invoked by the Ministry several weeks later 
192. Les Echos, Oct. 9, 1970, at 6, col. 1. 
191J. Les Echos, Dec. 29, 1970, at 6, col. 1. 
194-. Les Echos, Dec. 24-, 1970, at 6, col. 1. 
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in regard to a bid by General Foods Corporation to acquire Orangina, 
the large French soft drink company.195 The apparent motivation for 
the government's refusal was not so much outright opposition to 
foreign penetration in this nonstrategic sector of the economy as it 
was a desire to stave off a foreign takeover until it could be de-
termined whether a competing French takeover could be arranged. 
In the food products industry, as in a number of other industries, 
there has been a program of incentives to encourage industrial con-
centrations in the interest of structuring efficient and competitive 
French industries. In the Orangina case, the tactic worked: a French 
solution was found when a bid by the French companies, Ricard 
and Pernod, was forthcoming196 with the encouragement of the 
Institut de Developpement Industriel.107 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
The discussion in the preceding section of a few of the more 
recent negative government actions on foreign-investment proposals 
illustrates the discretionary powers of the French government in 
applying its foreign-investment procedure. There are no formal 
statutory criteria for the granting of foreign-investment authoriza-
tions with which the government is required to comply. The law 
thus provides no limitations on government agency action, but rather 
a procedure pursuant to which government discretion may be exer-
cised. The discretionary judgment is made on the basis of undefined 
economic and political factors. 
In fact, the reservation of state discretionary powers to deal with 
special problems that foreign investment may pose is not an unusual 
occurrence in the world today. In exceptional cases, foreign invest-
ment may be thought to impinge on national sovereignty itself, or 
at least to pose a threat to national goals.198 In such cases, states can 
be expected to act in formal or informal ways to oppose the invest-
ment. 
Occasionally, an investment may be rejected simply as an act of 
state without reliance on specific statutory authority. At other times, 
diplomatic or informal channels of communication may be used to 
inform the interested parties that the investment will not be permit-
ted. Such ad hoc intervention, while reflecting the discretionary 
195. Les Echos, Dec. 29, 1970, at 6, col. l. 
196. Les Echos, Dec. 24, 1970, at 6, col. l. 
197. See text accompanying note 145 supra. 
198. See A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACf!ONS 187-88 (W. 
Surrey &: C. Shaw ed. 1963). 
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powers of the state, can only be used in unusual circumstances and, 
in the absence of a requirement for notification of foreign investment, 
there is always the possibility that a government will be faced with 
the fait accompli of a completed foreign investment without having 
been able to take measures against it. 
In contrast to these regimes in which no formal investment con-
trol procedures have been established, the French have created a 
formidable system of exchange and foreign-investment controls that 
requires notification to and approval by the government of sub-
stantially all foreign investments and financings. This procedure 
has been used less frequently to bar absolutely particular investments 
than to require that foreign investments meet criteria considered 
to be favorable to the economy. While foreign investment controls 
are considered by the government to be only one of its many weapons 
for attaining a planned economy, it is nevertheless true that the 
government does not have the same veto power over new investment 
by domestic corporations that it enjoys over foreign investment. 
If it is true that the ultimate weapon of denial of investment 
authorization is, under French law, a nonreviewable action vested 
in Ministry discretion, 199 that does not mean that such action might 
not run counter to international obligations. These obligations are 
the result either of bilateral treaties-such as the Franco-American 
Convention of Establishment,200 which protects both the right of 
establishment and the right of investment-or of multilateral trea-
ties, of which the most important is the EEC Treaty. 
The authors suggested some years ago that the closer relation-
ships established by the EEC Treaty and the international mech-
anisms available for the enforcement of treaty rights made it likely 
that a protest would be made against French investment controls 
pursuant to the EEC Treaty rather than under the looser bilateral 
treaties.201 That suggestion apparently was accurate; the direct clash 
199. See Torem &: Craig, supra note 1, at 715-17. 
200. [1960) 2 U.S.T. 2398; (1960) J.O. 11220. Article 5 of this treaty provides for 
national treatment: 
I. Nationals and companies of either High Contracting Party shall be accorded 
national treatment with respect to engaging in all types of commercial, industrial, 
financial and other activities for gain within the territories of the other High Con-
tracting Party •.•. Accordingly, such nationals and companies shall be permitted 
within such territories: 
(b) to organize companies under the general company laws of such other 
High Contracting Party, and to acquire majority interests in companies of such 
other High Contracting Party; 
(c) to control and manage the enterprises which they have established or 
acquired. 
201. See Torem &: Craig, supra note I, at 711. 
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between the conttoJs,and the·.free-investment and free-establishment 
provisions of the Treaty resulted in a· law suit by the Commission 
against France in the European Court of Justice. However, that 
suit was settled by a common agreement that has permitted France 
to continue its foreign-investment policies and procedures without 
substantial modification, although France continues to be subject 
to an obligation to admit investment from other member countries 
after simple notification to the government about the proposed in-
vestment. 
For the future, perhaps the most important issue is whether the 
Common Market will develop a common foreign-investment policy 
in regard to third-country investment and whether procedures for 
the regulation of foreign investments in the Common Market will 
be developed. In this regard, we note that certain French attitudes 
toward the foreign-investment problem are gaining more Common 
Market support at the present time than has ever been the case in 
the past. The EEC Commission might, in special cases, oppose a 
specific foreign investment on economic or political grounds. How-
ever, it seems unlikely that other member countries, which do not 
have the same tradition of centralized financial power and govern-
ment economic control that France has, would support the kind 
of procedures operational in France that require a specific govern-
ment authorization · for every foreign investment. In these circum-
stances, one can expect that the French foreign-investment controls, 
with their highly developed filing and authorization procedures, will 
continue to stand alone in the Common Market. This fact should 
play a role in support of the continuation of the policies of modera-
tion that have marked application of the French controls in recent 
years. 
